It is an obvious criticism on the considerations which have been occupying us in the preceding chapters that they are too purely theoretical to be of any value.  They are indeed speculative, and, perhaps, from one point of view come under the edge of the usual condemnation of prophecy.  Prophecy is, of course, if one of the most interesting, also one of the most dangerous of human ingenuities, and the usual fate of prophets is, in nine cases out of ten, to be proved wrong.  Moreover, it is possible that there may come an issue to the present war which would be by far the worst which the human mind can conceive.  It may end in a deadlock, a stalemate, an impasse, because the two opposing forces are so equal that neither side can get the better of the other.  If peace has to be made because of such a balance between the opposing forces as this, it would be a calamity almost worse than the original war.  German militarism would still be unsubdued, the Kaiser’s pretensions to universal sovereignty, although clipped, would not be wiped out, and we should find remaining in all the nations of the earth a sort of sullen resentment which could not possibly lead to anything else than a purely temporary truce.  The only logical object of war is to make war impossible, and if merely an indecisive result were achieved in the present war, it would be as certain as anything human can be that a fresh war would soon arise.  At the present moment we confess that there is an ugly possibility of this kind, and that it is one of the most formidable perils of future civilisation.

AN IGNOBLE PACIFICATION

It is so immensely important, however, that the cause of the Allies should prevail not for their own sakes alone, but for the sake of the world, that it is difficult to imagine their consenting to an ignoble pacification.  The Allies have signed an important document, in order to prove their solidarity, that no one of them will sign peace without the sanction of the other partners.  Let us suppose that the rival armies have fought each other to a standstill; let us suppose that France is exhausted; let us further suppose that the German troops, by their mobility and their tactical skill, are able to hold the Russians in the eastern sphere of war.  We can suppose all these things, but what we cannot imagine even for a moment is that Great Britain—­to confine ourselves only to our own case—­will ever consent to stop until she has achieved her object.  America may strive to make the combatants desist from hostilities, partly because she is a great pacific power herself, and partly because it is a practical object with her as a commercial nation to secure tranquil conditions.  Yet, even so, there would be no answer to the question which most thoughtful minds would propound:  Why did we go to war, and what have we gained by the war?  If we went to war for large cosmic purposes, then we cannot consent to a peace which leaves those ultimate