independence of a nationality within its own limits, the other seeks to enforce something of the nature of a European police to see that every nation does its duty.  It is true, of course, that this public will of Europe must be incorporated in a kind of parliament, to which the separate nations must send their representatives, and that thus in a fashion each nation will have its proper say in any of the conclusions arrived at.  But here the difficulty starts anew owing to the relative size, and therefore the relative importance of the different states constituting the union.  If all alike are given an equivalent vote, it is rather hard on the big states, which represent larger numbers and therefore control larger destinies.  If, on the other hand, we adopt the principle of proportional representation, we may be pretty certain that the larger states will press somewhat heavily on the smaller.  For instance, suppose that some state violates, or threatens to violate, the public law of the world.  In that case the Universal Union must, of course, try to bring it to reason by peaceful means first, but if that should fail, the only other alternative is by force of arms.  If once we admit the right of the world-organisation to coerce its recalcitrant members, what becomes of the sovereign independence of nations?  That, as we have said, was the main difficulty confronting the European peace-maker of a hundred years ago, and, however we may choose to regard it, it remains a difficulty, we will not say insuperable, but at all events exceedingly formidable, for the European peace-makers of the twentieth century.  The antithesis is the old antithesis between order and progress; between coercion and independence; between the public voice, or, if we like to phrase it so, the public conscience, and the arbitrariness and irresponsibility of individual units.  Or we might put the problem in a still wider form.  A patriot is a man who believes intensely in the rights of his own nationality.  But if we have to form a United States of Europe we shall have gradually to soften, diminish, or perhaps even destroy the narrower conceptions of patriotism.  The ultimate evolution of democracy in the various peoples means the mutual recognition of their common interests, as against despotism and autocracy.  It is clear that such a process must gradually wipe out the distinction between the different peoples, and substitute for particularism something of universal import.  In such a process what, we ask once more, becomes of the principle of nationality, which is one of our immediate aims?  In point of fact, it is obvious that, from a strictly logical standpoint, the will of Europe, or the public right of Europe, and the free independence of nationalities are antithetical terms, and will continue to remain so, however cunningly, by a series of compromises, we may conceal their essential divergence.  That is the real problem which confronts us quite as obstinately as it did our forefathers after the destruction of the Napoleonic power.  And it will have to be faced by all reformers, whether they are pacifists or idealists, on ethical or political grounds.