87.  St. Augustine, however (as well as M. Bayle), does not despair of the possibility that the desired solution may be found upon earth; but this Father believes it to be reserved for some holy man illumined by a peculiar grace:  ’Est aliqua causa fortassis occultior, quae melioribus sanctioribusque reservatur, illius gratia potius quam meritis illorum’ (in De Genesi ad Literam, lib. 11, c. 4).  Luther reserves the knowledge of the Mystery of Election for the academy of heaven (lib. De Servo Arbitrio, c. 174):  ’Illic [Deus] gratiam et misericordiam spargit in indignos, his iram et severitatem spargit in immeritos; utrobique nimius et iniquus apud homines, sed justus et verax apud se ipsum.  Nam quomodo hoc justum sit ut indignos coronet, incomprehensibile est modo, videbimus autem, cum illuc venerimus, ubi jam non credetur, sed revelata facie videbitur.  Ita quomodo hoc justum sit, ut immeritos damnet, incomprehensibile est modo, creditur tamen, donec revelabitur filius hominis.’  It is to be hoped that M. Bayle now finds himself surrounded by that light which is lacking to us here below, since there is reason to suppose that he was not lacking in good will.

  VIRGIL
    Candidus insueti miratur limen Olympi,
    Sub pedibusque videt nubes et sidera Daphnis.

  LUCAN
    _...Illic postquam se lumine vero_
    Implevit, stellasque vagas miratur et astra
    Fixa polis, vidit quanta sub nocte jaceret
    Nostra dies.

         &nb
sp;                                                     [123]
       * * * * *

ESSAYS ON THE JUSTICE OF GOD AND THE FREEDOM OF MAN IN THE ORIGIN OF EVIL

* * * * *

PART ONE

1.  Having so settled the rights of faith and of reason as rather to place reason at the service of faith than in opposition to it, we shall see how they exercise these rights to support and harmonize what the light of nature and the light of revelation teach us of God and of man in relation to evil.  The difficulties are distinguishable into two classes.  The one kind springs from man’s freedom, which appears incompatible with the divine nature; and nevertheless freedom is deemed necessary, in order that man may be deemed guilty and open to punishment.  The other kind concerns the conduct of God, and seems to make him participate too much in the existence of evil, even though man be free and participate also therein.  And this conduct appears contrary to the goodness, the holiness and the justice of God, since God co-operates in evil as well physical as moral, and co-operates in each of them both morally and physically; and since it seems that these evils are manifested in the order of nature as well as in that of grace, and in the future and eternal life as well as, nay, more than, in this transitory life.