79.  Finally the author draws the conclusion:  ’If it were claimed that, on making an evident objection, a man has to be satisfied with an answer which we can only state as a thing possible though incomprehensible to us, that would be unfair.’  He repeats this in the posthumous Dialogues, against M. Jacquelot, p. 69.  I am not of this opinion.  If the objection were completely evident, it would triumph, and the thesis would be overthrown.  But when the objection is only founded on appearances or on instances of the most frequent occurrence, and when he who makes it desires to draw from it a universal and certain conclusion, he who upholds the Mystery may answer with the instance of a bare possibility.  For such an instance [119] suffices to show that what one wished to infer from the premisses, is neither certain nor general; and it suffices for him who upholds the Mystery to maintain that it is possible, without having to maintain that it is probable.  For, as I have often said, it is agreed that the Mysteries are against appearances.  He who upholds the Mystery need not even adduce such an instance; and should he adduce it, it were indeed a work of supererogation, or else an instrument of greater confusion to the adversary.

80.  There are passages of M. Bayle in the posthumous reply that he made to M. Jacquelot which seem to me still worthy of scrutiny.  ‘M.  Bayle’ (according to pp. 36, 37) ’constantly asserts in his Dictionary, whenever the subject allows, that our reason is more capable of refuting and destroying than of proving and building; that there is scarcely any philosophical or theological matter in respect of which it does not create great difficulties.  Thus’, he says, ’if one desired to follow it in a disputatious spirit, as far as it can go, one would often be reduced to a state of troublesome perplexity; and in fine, there are doctrines certainly true, which it disputes with insoluble objections.’  I think that what is said here in reproach of reason is to its advantage.  When it overthrows some thesis, it builds up the opposing thesis.  And when it seems to be overthrowing the two opposing theses at the same time, it is then that it promises us something profound, provided that we follow it as far as it can go, not in a disputatious spirit but with an ardent desire to search out and discover the truth, which will always be recompensed with a great measure of success.

81.  M. Bayle continues:  ’that one must then ridicule these objections, recognizing the narrow bounds of the human mind.’  And I think, on the other hand, that one must recognize the signs of the force of the human mind, which causes it to penetrate into the heart of things.  These are new openings and, as it were, rays of the dawn which promises us a greater light:  I mean in philosophical subjects or those of natural theology.  But when these objections are made against revealed faith it is enough that one be able to repel them,