(Clem.  Alex., Stromateis, 8), that is, words devoid of meaning.) ’He is condemned thenceforth by the rules for awarding victory; and even when he cannot be pursued in the mist wherewith he has covered himself, and which forms a kind of abyss between him and his antagonists, he is believed to be utterly defeated, and is compared to an army which, having lost the battle, steals away from the pursuit of the victor only under cover of night.’ (Matching allegory with allegory, I will say that the defender is not vanquished so long as he remains protected by his entrenchments; and if he risks some sortie beyond his need, it is permitted to him to withdraw within his fort, without being open to blame for that.)

77.  I was especially at pains to analyse this long passage where M. Bayle has put down his strongest and most skilfully reasoned statements in support of his opinion:  and I hope that I have shown clearly how this excellent man has been misled.  That happens all too easily to the ablest and shrewdest persons when they give free rein to their wit without exercising the patience necessary for delving down to the very foundations of their systems.  The details we have entered into here will serve as [118] answer to some other arguments upon the subject which are dispersed through the works of M. Bayle, as for instance when he says in his Reply to the Questions of a Provincial (vol.  III, ch. 133, p. 685):  ’To prove that one has brought reason and religion into harmony one must show not only that one has philosophic maxims favourable to our faith, but also that the particular maxims cast up against us as not being consistent with our Catechism are in reality consistent with it in a clearly conceived way.’  I do not see that one has need of all that, unless one aspire to press reasoning as far as the how of the Mystery.  When one is content to uphold its truth, without attempting to render it comprehensible, one has no need to resort to philosophic maxims, general or particular, for the proof; and when another brings up some philosophic maxims against us, it is not for us to prove clearly and distinctly that these maxims are consistent with our dogma, but it is for our opponent to prove that they are contrary thereto.

78.  M. Bayle continues thus in the same passage:  ’For this result we need an answer as clearly evident as the objection.’  I have already shown that it is obtained when one denies the premisses, but that for the rest it is not necessary for him who maintains the truth of the Mystery always to advance evident propositions, since the principal thesis concerning the Mystery itself is not evident.  He adds further:  ’If we must make reply and rejoinder, we must never rest in our positions, nor claim that we have accomplished our design, so long as our opponent shall make answer with things as evident as our reasons can be.’  But it is not for the defender to adduce reasons; it is enough for him to answer those of his opponent.