objections); ’whether the premisses of a proof (advanced by the opposer) ’are true; whether the conclusion is properly drawn; whether a four-term Syllogism has been employed; whether some aphorism of the chapter de oppositis or de sophisticis elenchis, etc., has not been violated.’ (It is enough, putting it briefly, to deny some premiss or some conclusion, or finally to explain or get explained some ambiguous term.) ’One comes off victorious either by showing that the subject of dispute has no connexion with the principles which had been agreed upon’ (that is to say, by showing that the objection proves nothing, and then the defender wins the case), ’or by reducing the defender to absurdity’ (when all the premisses and all the conclusions are well proved).  ’Now one can reduce him to that point either by showing him that the conclusions of his thesis are “yes” and “no” at once, or by constraining him to say only intelligible things in answer.’ (This last embarrassment he can always avoid, because he has no need to advance new theses.) ’The aim in disputes of this kind is to throw light upon obscurities and to arrive at self-evidence.’ (It is the aim of the opposer, for he wishes to demonstrate that the Mystery is false; but this cannot here be the aim of the defender, for in admitting Mystery he agrees that one cannot demonstrate it.) ’This leads to the opinion that during the course of the proceedings victory sides more or less with the defender or with the opposer, according to whether there is more or less clarity in the propositions of the one than in the propositions of the other.’ (That [117] is speaking as if the defender and the opposer were equally unprotected; but the defender is like a besieged commander, covered by his defence works, and it is for the attacker to destroy them.  The defender has no need here of self-evidence, and he seeks it not:  but it is for the opposer to find it against him, and to break through with his batteries in order that the defender may be no longer protected.)

76.  ’Finally, it is judged that victory goes against him whose answers are such that one comprehends nothing in them,’ (It is a very equivocal sign of victory:  for then one must needs ask the audience if they comprehend anything in what has been said, and often their opinions would be divided.  The order of formal disputes is to proceed by arguments in due form and to answer them by denying or making a distinction.) ’and who confesses that they are incomprehensible.’ (It is permitted to him who maintains the truth of a Mystery to confess that this mystery is incomprehensible; and if this confession were sufficient for declaring him vanquished there would be no need of objection.  It will be possible for a truth to be incomprehensible, but never so far as to justify the statement that one comprehends nothing at all therein.  It would be in that case what the ancient Schools called Scindapsus or Blityri