say that it cannot provide answers to its own objections, and that thus they remain victorious, so long as one does not have recourse to the authority of God and to the necessity of subjugating one’s understanding to the obedience of faith.’  I do not find that there is any force in this reasoning.  We can attain to that which is above us not by penetrating it but by maintaining it; as we can attain to the sky by sight, and not by touch.  Nor is it necessary that, in order to answer the objections which are made against the Mysteries, one should have them in subjection to oneself, and submit them to examination by comparison with the first principles that spring from common notions.  For if he who answers the objections had to go so far, he who proposes the objections needs must do it first.  It is the part of the objection to open up the subject, and it is enough for him who answers to say Yes or No.  He is not obliged to counter with a distinction:  it will do, in case of need, if he denies the universality of some proposition in the objection or criticizes its form, and one may do both these things without penetrating beyond the objection.  When someone offers me a proof which he maintains is invincible, I can keep silence while I compel him merely to prove in due form all the enunciations that he brings forward, and such as appear to me in the slightest degree doubtful.  For the purpose of doubting only, I need not at all probe to the heart of the matter; on the contrary, the more ignorant I am the more shall I be justified in doubting.  M. Bayle continues thus: 

73.  ’Let us endeavour to clarify that.  If some doctrines are above reason they are beyond its reach, it cannot attain to them; if it cannot attain to them, it cannot comprehend them.’ (He could have begun here with the ‘comprehend’, saying that reason cannot comprehend that which is above it.) ‘If it cannot comprehend them, it can find in them no idea’ (Non valet consequentia:  for, to ‘comprehend’ something, it is not enough that one have some ideas thereof; one must have all the ideas of everything that goes to make it up, and all these ideas must be clear, distinct, adequate.  There are a thousand objects in Nature in which we understand something, but which we do not therefore necessarily comprehend.  We have some ideas on the rays of light, we demonstrate upon them up to a certain point; but there ever remains something which makes us confess that we do not yet comprehend the whole nature of light.) ’nor any principle such[115] as may give rise to a solution;’ (Why should not evident principles be found mingled with obscure and confused knowledge?) ’and consequently the objections that reason has made will remain unanswered;’ (By no means; the difficulty is rather on the side of the opposer.  It is for him to seek an evident principle such as may give rise to some objection; and the more obscure the subject, the more trouble he will have in finding such a principle.  Moreover,