66.  Thus it may be seen from all I have just said that M. Bayle carries too far the being above reason, as if it included the insoluble nature of objections:  for according to him (Reply to the Questions of a Provincial, vol.  III, ch. 130, p. 651) ’once a dogma is above reason, philosophy can neither explain it nor comprehend it, nor meet the difficulties that are urged against it’.  I agree with regard to comprehension, but I have already shown that the Mysteries receive a necessary verbal explanation, to the end that the terms employed be not sine mente soni, words signifying nothing.  I have shown also that it is necessary for one to be capable of answering the objections, and that otherwise one must needs reject the thesis.

67.  He adduces the authority of theologians, who appear to recognize the insoluble nature of the objections against the Mysteries.  Luther is one of the chief of these; but I have already replied, in Sec. 12, to the passage where he seems to say that philosophy contradicts theology.  There is another passage (De Servo Arbitrio, ch. 246) where he says that the apparent injustice of God is proved by arguments taken from the [111] adversity of good people and the prosperity of the wicked, an argument irresistible both for all reason and for natural intelligence (’Argumentis talibus traducta, quibus nulla ratio aut lumen naturae potest resistere’).  But soon afterwards he shows that he means it only of those who know nothing of the life to come, since he adds that an expression in the Gospel dissipates this difficulty, teaching us that there is another life, where that which has not been punished and rewarded in this life shall receive its due.  The objection is then far from being insuperable, and even without the aid of the Gospel one could bethink oneself of this answer.  There is also quoted (Reply, vol.  III, p. 652) a passage from Martin Chemnitz, criticized by Vedelius and defended by Johann Musaeus, where this famous theologian seems to say clearly that there are truths in the word of God which are not only above reason but also against reason.  But this passage must be taken as referring only to the principles of reason that are in accordance with the order of Nature, as Musaeus also interprets it.

68.  It is true nevertheless that M. Bayle finds some authorities who are more favourable to him, M. Descartes being one of the chief.  This great man says positively (Part I of his Principles, art. 41) ’that we shall have not the slightest trouble in ridding ourselves of the difficulty’ (which one may have in harmonizing the freedom of our will with the order of the eternal providence of God) ’if we observe that our thought is finite, and that the Knowledge and the Omnipotence of God, whereby he has not only known from all eternity all that which is or which can be, but also has willed it, is infinite.  We have therefore quite enough intelligence to recognize