is somewhat thorny, as for instance when one asks oneself, quod vitae sectabor iter? what profession one must choose; when it is a question of a marriage being arranged, of a war being undertaken, of a battle being fought; for in these cases many will be inclined to evade the difficulty of consideration and abandon themselves to fate or to inclination, as if reason should not be employed except in easy cases.  One will then all too often reason in the Turkish fashion (although this way is wrongly termed trusting in providence, a thing that in reality occurs only when one has done one’s duty) and one will employ the lazy reason, derived from the idea of inevitable fate, to relieve oneself of the need to reason properly.  One will thus overlook the fact that if this [56] argument contrary to the practice of reason were valid, it would always hold good, whether the consideration were easy or not.  This laziness is to some extent the source of the superstitious practices of fortune-tellers, which meet with just such credulity as men show towards the philosopher’s stone, because they would fain have short cuts to the attainment of happiness without trouble.

I do not speak here of those who throw themselves upon fortune because they have been happy before, as if there were something permanent therein.  Their argument from the past to the future has just as slight a foundation as the principles of astrology and of other kinds of divination.  They overlook the fact that there is usually an ebb and flow in fortune, una marea, as Italians playing basset are wont to call it.  With regard to this they make their own particular observations, which I would, nevertheless, counsel none to trust too much.  Yet this confidence that people have in their fortune serves often to give courage to men, and above all to soldiers, and causes them to have indeed that good fortune they ascribe to themselves.  Even so do predictions often cause that to happen which has been foretold, as it is supposed that the opinion the Mahometans hold on fate makes them resolute.  Thus even errors have their use at times, but generally as providing a remedy for other errors:  and truth is unquestionably better.

But it is taking an unfair advantage of this alleged necessity of fate to employ it in excuse for our vices and our libertinism.  I have often heard it said by smart young persons, who wished to play the freethinker, that it is useless to preach virtue, to censure vice, to create hopes of reward and fears of punishment, since it may be said of the book of destiny, that what is written is written, and that our behaviour can change nothing therein.  Thus, they would say, it were best to follow one’s inclination, dwelling only upon such things as may content us in the present.  They did not reflect upon the strange consequences of this argument, which would prove too much, since it would prove (for instance) that one should take a pleasant beverage even though one knows it is poisoned.