these transformations, but it is not as with the Fairies,
by a mere act of this magic power, but by obscuring
and suppressing in one’s mind the representations
of good or bad qualities which are naturally attached
to certain objects, and by contemplating only such
representations as conform to our taste or our prejudices;
or [435] again, because one attaches to the objects,
by dint of thinking of them, certain qualities which
are connected with them only accidentally or through
our habitual contemplation of them. For example,
all my life long I detest a certain kind of good food,
because in my childhood I found in it something distasteful,
which made a strong impression upon me. On the
other hand, a certain natural defect will be pleasing
to me, because it will revive within me to some extent
the thought of a person I used to esteem or love.
A young man will have been delighted by the applause
which has been showered upon him after some successful
public action; the impression of this great pleasure
will have made him remarkably sensitive to reputation;
he will think day and night of nothing save what nourishes
this passion, and that will cause him to scorn death
itself in order to attain his end. For although
he may know very well that he will not feel what is
said of him after his death, the representation he
makes of it for himself beforehand creates a strong
impression on his mind. And there are always
motives of the same kind in actions which appear most
useless and absurd to those who do not enter into
these motives. In a word, a strong or oft-repeated
impression may alter considerably our organs, our imagination,
our memory, and even our reasoning. It happens
that a man, by dint of having often related something
untrue, which he has perhaps invented, finally comes
to believe in it himself. And as one often represents
to oneself something pleasing, one makes it easy to
imagine, and one thinks it also easy to put into effect,
whence it comes that one persuades oneself easily
of what one wishes.
Et qui amant ipsi sibi somnia fingunt.
25. Errors are therefore, absolutely speaking,
never voluntary, although the will very often contributes
towards them indirectly, owing to the pleasure one
takes in giving oneself up to certain thoughts, or
owing to the aversion one feels for others. Beautiful
print in a book will help towards making it persuasive
to the reader. The air and manner of a speaker
will win the audience for him. One will be inclined
to despise doctrines coming from a man one despises
or hates, or from another who resembles him in some
point that strikes us. I have already said why
one is readily disposed to believe what is advantageous
or agreeable, and I have known people who at first
had changed their religion for worldly [436]
considerations, but who have been persuaded (and well
persuaded) afterwards that they had taken the right
course. One sees also that stubbornness is not