could be so contrary to the hypothesis he has put forward, and he does right to overthrow it, rather than prolong the existence of anything so charged with incongruities incompatible with the goodness and wisdom of God.  Here is the way to see plainly that this hypothesis cannot harmonize with what has just been said.  The first question will be:  Will God create something or not, and wherefore?  The author has answered that he will create something in order to communicate his goodness.  It is therefore no matter of indifference to him whether he shall create or not.  Next the question is asked:  Will God create such and such a thing, and wherefore?  One must needs answer (to speak consistently) that the same goodness makes him choose the best, and indeed the author falls back on that subsequently.  But, following his own hypothesis, he answers that God will create such a thing, but that there is no wherefore, because God is absolutely indifferent towards creatures, who have their goodness only from his choice.  It is true that our author varies somewhat on this point, for he says here (ch. 5, sect. 5, sub-sect. 4, Sec. 12) that God is indifferent to the choice between men of equal perfection, or between equally perfect kinds of rational creatures.  Thus, according to this form of expression, he would choose rather the more perfect kind:  and as kinds that are of equal perfection harmonize more or less with others, God will choose those that agree best together; there will therefore be no pure and absolute indifference, and the author thus comes back to my principles.  But let us speak, as he speaks, in accordance with his hypothesis, and let us assume with him that God chooses certain creatures even though he be absolutely indifferent towards them.  He will then just as soon choose creatures that are irregular, ill-shapen, mischievous, unhappy, chaos everlasting, monsters everywhere, [431] scoundrels as sole inhabitants of the earth, devils filling the whole universe, all this rather than excellent systems, shapely forms, upright persons, good angels!  No, the author will say, God, when once he had resolved to create men, resolved at the same time to give them all the advantages possible in the world, and it is the same with regard to creatures of other kinds.  I answer, that if this advantage were connected of necessity with their nature, the author would be speaking in accordance with his hypothesis.  That not being so, however, he must admit that God’s resolve to give every possible advantage to men arises from a new election independent of that one which prompted God to make men.  But whence comes this new election?  Does it also come from mere indifference?  If such is the case, nothing prompts God to seek the good of men, and if he sometimes comes to do it, it will be merely by accident.  But the author maintains that God was prompted to the choice by his goodness; therefore the good and ill of creatures is no matter of indifference to him, and there are in him primary