a natural inclination.  Thus will the divine will be the cause of goodness in beings.  That is to say, there will be goodness in the objects, not by their [428] nature, but by the will of God:  whereas if that will be excluded neither good nor evil can exist in things.  It is difficult to imagine how writers of merit could have been misled by so strange an opinion, for the reason which appears to be advanced here has not the slightest force.  It seems to me as though an attempt is being made to justify this opinion by the consideration that all creatures have their whole being from God, so that they cannot act upon him or determine him.  But this is clearly an instance of self-deception.  When we say that an intelligent substance is actuated by the goodness of its object, we do not assert that this object is necessarily a being existing outside the substance, and it is enough for us that it be conceivable:  for its representation acts in the substance, or rather the substance acts upon itself, in so far as it is disposed and influenced by this representation.  With God, it is plain that his understanding contains the ideas of all possible things, and that is how everything is in him in a transcendent manner.  These ideas represent to him the good and evil, the perfection and imperfection, the order and disorder, the congruity and incongruity of possibles; and his superabundant goodness makes him choose the most advantageous.  God therefore determines himself by himself; his will acts by virtue of his goodness, but it is particularized and directed in action by understanding filled with wisdom.  And since his understanding is perfect, since his thoughts are always clear, his inclinations always good, he never fails to do the best; whereas we may be deceived by the mere semblances of truth and goodness.  But how is it possible for it to be said that there is no good or evil in the ideas before the operation of God’s will?  Does the will of God form the ideas which are in his understanding?  I dare not ascribe to our learned author so strange a sentiment, which would confuse understanding and will, and would subvert the current use of our notions.  Now if ideas are independent of will, the perfection or imperfection which is represented in them will be independent also.  Indeed, is it by the will of God, for example, or is it not rather by the nature of numbers, that certain numbers allow more than others of various exact divisions? that some are more fitted than others for forming battalions, composing polygons and other regular figures? that the number six has the advantage of being the least of all the numbers that are called perfect? that in a plane six equal circles may touch a seventh? that of all equal bodies, the sphere has the least surface? that [429] certain lines are incommensurable, and consequently ill-adapted for harmony?  Do we not see that all these advantages or disadvantages spring from the idea of the thing, and that the contrary