manifest that there is nothing which would set limits to that power, since limits would withdraw it from its pure indifference, whence, so our author alleges, it only emerges of itself, or rather wherein it has never been.  Finally one does not see wherein the perfection of pure indifference lies:  on the contrary, there is nothing more imperfect; it would render knowledge and goodness futile, and would reduce everything to chance, with no rules, and no measures that could be taken.  There are, however, still some advantages adduced by our author which have not been discussed.  He considers then that by this power alone are we the true cause to which our actions can be imputed, since otherwise we should be under the compulsion of external objects; likewise that by this power alone can one ascribe to oneself the merit of one’s own felicity, and feel pleased with [426] oneself.  But the exact opposite is the case:  for when one happens upon the action through an absolutely indifferent movement, and not as a result of one’s good or bad qualities, is it not just as though one were to happen upon it blindly by chance or hazard?  Why then should one boast of a good action, or why should one be censured for an evil one, if the thanks or blame redounds to fortune or hazard?  I think that one is more worthy of praise when one owes the action to one’s good qualities, and the more culpable in proportion as one has been impelled to it by one’s evil qualities.  To attempt to assess actions without weighing the qualities whence they spring is to talk at random and to put an imaginary indefinable something in the place of causes.  Thus, if this chance or this indefinable something were the cause of our actions, to the exclusion of our natural or acquired qualities, of our inclinations, of our habits, it would not be possible to set one’s hopes upon anything depending upon the resolve of others, since it would not be possible to fix something indefinite, or to conjecture into what roadstead the uncertain weather of an extravagant indifference will drive the vessel of the will.

20.  But setting aside advantages and disadvantages, let us see how our learned author will justify the hypothesis from which he promises us so much good.  He imagines that it is only God and the free creatures who are active in the true sense, and that in order to be active one must be determined by oneself only.  Now that which is determined by itself must not be determined by objects, and consequently the free substance, in so far as it is free, must be indifferent with regard to objects, and emerge from this indifference only by its own choice, which shall render the object pleasing to it.  But almost all the stages of this argument have their stumbling-blocks.  Not only the free creatures, but also all the other substances and natures composed of substances, are active.  Beasts are not free, and yet all the same they have active souls, unless one assume, with the Cartesians,