felicity depends upon external things, if it is true that it depends upon the representation of good or evil.  It is therefore not in our own power, so it is said, for we have no ground for hoping that outward things will arrange themselves for our pleasure.  This argument is halting from every aspect. There is no force in the inference:  one might grant the conclusion:  the argument may be retorted upon the author.  Let us begin with the retort, which is easy.  For are men any happier or more independent of the accidents of fortune upon this argument, or because they are credited with the advantage of choosing without reason?  Have they less bodily suffering?  Have they less tendency toward true or apparent goods, less fear of true or imaginary evils?  Are they any less enslaved by sensual pleasure, by ambition, by avarice? less apprehensive? less envious?  Yes, our gifted author will say; I will prove it by a method of counting or assessment.  I would rather he had proved it by experience; but let us see this proof by counting.  Suppose that by my choice, which enables me to give goodness-for-me to that which I choose, I give to the object chosen six degrees of goodness, when previously there were two degrees of evil in my condition; I shall become happy all at once, and with perfect ease, for I should have four degrees surplus, or net good.  Doubtless that is all very well; but unfortunately it is impossible.  For what possibility is there of giving these six degrees of goodness to the object?  To that end we must needs have the power to change our taste, or the things, as we please.  That would be almost as if I could say to [424] lead, Thou shalt be gold, and make it so; to the pebble, Thou shalt be diamond; or at the least, Thou shalt look like it.  Or it would be like the common explanation of the Mosaical passage which seems to say that the desert manna assumed any taste the Israelites desired to give to it.  They only had to say to their homerful, Thou shalt be a capon, thou shalt be a partridge.  But if I am free to give these six degrees of goodness to the object, am I not permitted to give it more goodness?  I think that I am.  But if that is so, why shall we not give to the object all the goodness conceivable?  Why shall we not even go as far as twenty-four carats of goodness?  By this means behold us completely happy, despite the accidents of fortune; it may blow, hail or snow, and we shall not mind:  by means of this splendid secret we shall be always shielded against fortuitous events.  The author agrees (in this first section of the fifth chapter, sub-sect. 3, Sec. 12) that this power overcomes all the natural appetites and cannot be overcome by any of them; and he regards it (Sec.Sec. 20, 21, 22) as the soundest foundation for happiness.  Indeed, since there is nothing capable of limiting a power so indeterminate as that of choosing without any reason, and of giving goodness to the object through the choice, either this