17.  Fifthly, the objection is made that, according to my opinion, sin would neither be censured nor punished because of its deserts, but because the censure and the chastisement serve to prevent it another time; whereas men demand something more, namely, satisfaction for the crime, even though it should serve neither for amendment nor for example.  So do men with reason demand that true gratitude should come from a true recognition of the past benefit, and not from the interested aim of extorting a fresh benefit.  This objection contains noble and sound considerations, but it does not strike at me.  I require a man to be virtuous, grateful, just, not only from the motive of interest, of hope or of fear, but also of the pleasure that he should find in good actions:  else one has not yet reached the degree of virtue that one must endeavour to attain.  That is what one means by saying that justice and virtue must be loved for their own sake; and it is also what I explained in justifying ‘disinterested love’, shortly before the opening of the controversy which caused so much stir.  Likewise I consider that wickedness is all the greater when its practice becomes a pleasure, as when a highwayman, after having killed men because they resist, or because he fears their vengeance, finally grows cruel and takes pleasure in killing them, and even in making them suffer beforehand.  Such a degree of wickedness is taken to be diabolical, even though the man affected with it finds in this execrable indulgence a stronger reason for his homicides than he had when he killed simply under the influence of hope or of fear.  I have also observed in answering the difficulties of M. Bayle that, according to the celebrated Conringius, justice which punishes by means of medicinal penalties, so to speak, that is, in order to correct the criminal or at least to provide an example for others, might exist in the opinion of those who do away with the freedom that is exempt from necessity.  True [423] retributive justice, on the other hand, going beyond the medicinal, assumes something more, namely, intelligence and freedom in him who sins, because the harmony of things demands a satisfaction, or evil in the form of suffering, to make the mind feel its error after the voluntary active evil whereto it has consented.  Mr. Hobbes also, who does away with freedom, has rejected retributive justice, as do the Socinians, drawing on themselves the condemnation of our theologians; although the writers of the Socinian party are wont to exaggerate the idea of freedom.

18.  Sixthly, the objection is finally made that men cannot hope for felicity if the will can only be actuated by the representation of good and evil.  But this objection seems to me completely null and void, and I think it would be hard to guess how any tolerable interpretation was ever put upon it.  Moreover, the line of reasoning adopted to prove it is of a most astounding nature:  it is that our