to show that one could not have prevented men from being prone to errors, without changing the [421] constitution of the best of systems or without employing miracles at every turn.  It is true that sin makes up a large portion of human wretchedness, and even the largest; but that does not prevent one from being able to say that men are wicked and deserving of punishment:  else one must needs say that the actual sins of the non-regenerate are excusable, because they spring from the first cause of our wretchedness, which is original sin.  Fourthly, to say that the soul becomes passive and that man is not the true cause of sin, if he is prompted to his voluntary actions by their objects, as our author asserts in many passages, and particularly ch. 5, sect. 1, sub-sect. 3, Sec. 18, is to create for oneself new senses for terms.  When the ancients spoke of that which is [Greek:  eph’ hemin], or when we speak of that which depends upon us, of spontaneity, of the inward principle of our actions, we do not exclude the representation of external things; for these representations are in our souls, they are a portion of the modifications of this active principle which is within us.  No agent is capable of acting without being predisposed to what the action demands; and the reasons or inclinations derived from good or evil are the dispositions that enable the soul to decide between various courses.  One will have it that the will is alone active and supreme, and one is wont to imagine it to be like a queen seated on her throne, whose minister of state is the understanding, while the passions are her courtiers or favourite ladies, who by their influence often prevail over the counsel of her ministers.  One will have it that the understanding speaks only at this queen’s order; that she can vacillate between the arguments of the minister and the suggestions of the favourites, even rejecting both, making them keep silence or speak, and giving them audience or not as seems good to her.  But it is a personification or mythology somewhat ill-conceived.  If the will is to judge, or take cognizance of the reasons and inclinations which the understanding or the senses offer it, it will need another understanding in itself, to understand what it is offered.  The truth is that the soul, or the thinking substance, understands the reasons and feels the inclinations, and decides according to the predominance of the representations modifying its active force, in order to shape the action.  I have no need here to apply my system of Pre-established Harmony, which shows our independence to the best advantage and frees us from the physical influence of objects.  For what I have just said is sufficient to answer the objection.  Our [422] author, even though he admits with people in general this physical influence of objects upon us, observes nevertheless with much perspicacity that the body or the objects of the senses do not even give us our ideas, much less the active force of our soul, and that they serve only to draw out that which is within us.  This is much in the spirit of M. Descartes’ belief that the soul, not being able to give force to the body, gives it at least some direction.  It is a mean between one side and the other, between physical influence and Pre-established Harmony.