15.  This explanation dismisses all the objections of our gifted opponent.  In the first place, it is seen that contingency exists together with freedom.  Secondly, evil wills are evil not only because they do harm, but also because they are a source of harmful things, or of physical evils, a wicked spirit being, in the sphere of its activity, what the evil principle of the Manichaeans would be in the universe.  Moreover, the author has observed (ch. 4, sect. 4, Sec. 8) that divine wisdom has usually forbidden actions which would cause discomforts, that is to say, physical evils.[420] It is agreed that he who causes evil by necessity is not culpable.  But there is neither legislator nor lawyer who by this necessity means the force of the considerations of good or evil, real or apparent, that have prompted man to do ill:  else anyone stealing a great sum of money or killing a powerful man in order to attain to high office would be less deserving of punishment than one who should steal a few halfpence for a mug of beer or wantonly kill his neighbour’s dog, since these latter were tempted less.  But it is quite the opposite in the administration of justice which is authorized in the world:  for the greater is the temptation to sin, the more does it need to be repressed by the fear of a great chastisement.  Besides, the greater the calculation evident in the design of an evil-doer, the more will it be found that the wickedness has been deliberate, and the more readily will one decide that it is great and deserving of punishment.  Thus a too artful fraud causes the aggravating crime called stellionate, and a cheat becomes a forger when he has the cunning to sap the very foundations of our security in written documents.  But one will have greater indulgence for a great passion, because it is nearer to madness.  The Romans punished with the utmost severity the priests of the God Apis, when these had prostituted the chastity of a noble lady to a knight who loved her to distraction, making him pass as their god; while it was found enough to send the lover into exile.  But if someone had done evil deeds without apparent reason and without appearance of passion the judge would be tempted to take him for a madman, especially if it proved that he was given to committing such extravagances often:  this might tend towards reduction of the penalty, rather than supplying the true grounds of wickedness and punishment.  So far removed are the principles of our opponents from the practice of the tribunals and from the general opinion of men.

16.  Thirdly, the distinction between physical evil and moral evil will still remain, although there be this in common between them, that they have their reasons and causes.  And why manufacture new difficulties for oneself concerning the origin of moral evil, since the principle followed in the solution of those which natural evils have raised suffices also to account for voluntary evils?  That is to say, it suffices