Leibniz passes from the remarks about his own doctrine under the article ‘Rorarius’ to other articles of Bayle’s dictionary, and touches the question of the origin of evil, and other matters which receive their fuller treatment in the Theodicy.

In the same year Leibniz wrote a very friendly letter to Bayle himself, offering further explanations of disputed points.  He concluded it with a paragraph of some personal interest, comparing himself the historian-philosopher with Bayle the philosophic lexicographer, and revealing by the way his attitude to philosophy, science and history: 

’We have good reason to admire, Sir, the way in which your striking reflexions on the deepest questions of philosophy remain unhindered by your boundless researches into matters of fact.  I too am not always able to excuse myself from discussions of the sort, and have even been obliged to descend to questions of genealogy, which would be still more trifling, were it not that the interests of States frequently depend upon them.  I have worked much on the history of Germany in so far as it bears upon these countries, a study which has furnished me with some observations belonging to general history.  So I have learnt not to neglect the knowledge of sheer facts.  But if the choice were open to me, I should prefer natural history to political, and the customs and laws God has established in nature, to what is observed among mankind.’

Leibniz now conceived the idea of putting together all the passages in Bayle’s works which interested him, and writing a systematic answer to them.  Before he had leisure to finish the task, Bayle died.  The work nevertheless appeared in 1710 as the Essays in Theodicy.

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PREFACE

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It has ever been seen that men in general have resorted to outward forms for the expression of their religion:  sound piety, that is to say, light and virtue, has never been the portion of the many.  One should not wonder at this, nothing is so much in accord with human weakness.  We are impressed by what is outward, while the inner essence of things requires consideration of such a kind as few persons are fitted to give.  As true piety consists in principles and practice, the outward forms of religion imitate these, and are of two kinds:  the one kind consists in ceremonial practices, and the other in the formularies of belief.  Ceremonies resemble virtuous actions, and formularies are like shadows of the truth and approach, more or less, the true light.  All these outward forms would be commendable if those who invented them had rendered them appropriate to maintain and to express that which they imitate—­if religious ceremonies, ecclesiastical discipline, the rules of communities,