14.  It will be necessary to answer these objections to my opinion before proceeding to establish that of our author.  The misapprehension of my opponents originates in their confusing a consequence which is necessary absolutely, whose contrary implies contradiction, with a consequence which is founded only upon truths of fitness, and nevertheless has its effect.  To put it otherwise, there is a confusion between what depends upon the principle of contradiction, which makes necessary and indispensable truths, and what depends upon the principle of the sufficient reason, which [419] applies also to contingent truths.  I have already elsewhere stated this proposition, which is one of the most important in philosophy, pointing out that there are two great principles, namely, that of identicals or of contradiction, which states that of two contradictory enunciations the one is true and the other false, and that of the sufficient reason, which states that there is no true enunciation whose reason could not be seen by one possessing all the knowledge necessary for its complete understanding.  Both principles must hold not only in necessary but also in contingent truths; and it is even necessary that that which has no sufficient reason should not exist.  For one may say in a sense that these two principles are contained in the definition of the true and the false.  Nevertheless, when in making the analysis of the truth submitted one sees it depending upon truths whose contrary implies contradiction, one may say that it is absolutely necessary.  But when, while pressing the analysis to the furthest extent, one can never attain to such elements of the given truth, one must say that it is contingent, and that it originates from a prevailing reason which inclines without necessitating.  Once that is granted, it is seen how we can say with sundry famous philosophers and theologians, that the thinking substance is prompted to its resolution by the prevailing representation of good or of evil, and this certainly and infallibly, but not necessarily, that is, by reasons which incline it without necessitating it.  That is why contingent futurities, foreseen both in themselves and through their reasons, remain contingent.  God was led infallibly by his wisdom and by his goodness to create the world through his power, and to give it the best possible form; but he was not led thereto of necessity, and the whole took place without any diminution of his perfect and supreme wisdom.  And I do not know if it would be easy, apart from the reflexions we have just entertained, to untie the Gordian knot of contingency and freedom.