6.  Thereafter he proceeds to examine whether motion, matter and space spring from themselves; and to that end he considers whether it is possible to conceive that they do not exist.  He remarks upon this privilege of God, that as soon as it is assumed that he exists it must be admitted that he exists of necessity.  This is a corollary to a remark which I made in the little discourse mentioned above, namely that as soon as one admits that God is possible, one must admit that he exists of necessity.  Now, as soon as one admits that God exists, one admits that he is possible.  Therefore as soon as one admits that God exists, one must admit that he exists of necessity.  Now this privilege does not belong to the three things of which we have just spoken.  The author believes also especially concerning motion, that it is not sufficient to say, with Mr. Hobbes, that the present movement comes from an anterior movement, and this one again from another, and so on to infinity.  For, however far back you may go, you will not be one whit nearer to finding the reason which causes the presence of motion in matter.  Therefore this reason must be outside the sequence; and even if there were an eternal motion, it would require an eternal motive power.  So the rays of the sun, even though they were eternal with the sun, would nevertheless have their eternal cause in the sun.  I am well pleased to recount these arguments of our gifted author, that it may be seen how important, according to him, is the principle of sufficient reason.  For, if it is permitted to admit something for which it is acknowledged there is no reason, it will be easy for an atheist to overthrow this argument, by [411] saying that it is not necessary that there be a sufficient reason for the existence of motion.  I will not enter into the discussion of the reality and the eternity of space, for fear of straying too far from our subject.  It is enough to state that the author believes that space can be annihilated by the divine power, but in entirety and not in portions, and that we could exist alone with God even if there were neither space nor matter, since we do not contain within ourselves the notion of the existence of external things.  He also puts forward the consideration that in the sensations of sounds, of odours and of savours the idea of space is not included.  But whatever the opinion formed as to space, it suffices that there is a God, the cause of matter and of motion, and in short of all things.  The author believes that we can reason about God, as one born blind would reason about light.  But I hold that there is something more in us, for our light is a ray from God’s light.  After having spoken of some attributes of God, the author acknowledges that God acts for an end, which is the communication of his goodness, and that his works are ordered aright.  Finally he concludes this chapter very properly, by saying that God in creating the world was at pains to give it the greatest harmony amongst things, the greatest comfort of beings endowed with reason, and the greatest compatibility in desires that an infinite power, wisdom and goodness combined could produce.  He adds that, if some evil has remained notwithstanding, one must believe that these infinite divine perfections could not have (I would rather say ought not to have) taken it away.