is possible, without the intervention of choice founded
on good, how can he make himself worthy of love?
It is therefore the doctrine either of blind power
or of arbitrary power, which destroys piety: for
the one destroys the intelligent principle or the
providence of God, the other attributes to him actions
which are appropriate to the evil principle. Justice
in God, says Mr. Hobbes (p. 161), is nothing but the
power he has, which he exercises in distributing blessings
and afflictions. This definition surprises me:
it is not the power to distribute them, but the will
to distribute them reasonably, that is, goodness guided
by wisdom, which makes the justice of God. But,
says he, justice is not in God as in a man, who is
only just through the observance of laws made by his
superior. Mr. Hobbes is mistaken also in that,
as well as Herr Pufendorf, who followed him. Justice
does not depend upon arbitrary laws of superiors,
but on the eternal rules of wisdom and of goodness,
in men as well as in God. Mr. Hobbes asserts in
the same passage that the wisdom which is attributed
to God does not lie in a logical consideration of
the relation of means to ends, but in an incomprehensible
attribute, attributed to an incomprehensible nature
to honour it. It seems as if he means that it
is an indescribable something attributed to an indescribable
something, and even a chimerical quality given to
a chimerical substance, to intimidate and to deceive
the nations through the worship which they render
to it. After all, it is difficult for Mr. Hobbes
to have a different opinion of God and of wisdom, since
he admits only material substances. If Mr. Hobbes
were still alive, I would beware of ascribing to him
opinions which might do him injury; but it [404] is
difficult to exempt him from this. He may have
changed his mind subsequently, for he attained to
a great age; thus I hope that his errors may not have
been deleterious to him. But as they might be
so to others, it is expedient to give warnings to
those who shall read the writings of one who otherwise
is of great merit, and from whom one may profit in
many ways. It is true that God does not reason,
properly speaking, using time as we do, to pass from
one truth to the other: but as he understands
at one and the same time all the truths and all their
connexions, he knows all the conclusions, and he contains
in the highest degree within himself all the reasonings
that we can develop. And just because of that
his wisdom is perfect.
&nb
sp; [405]
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OBSERVATIONS ON THE BOOK CONCERNING ‘THE ORIGIN OF EVIL’ PUBLISHED RECENTLY IN LONDON
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