decree were at least as strict as the others, having oppressed their opponents in Holland with the authority of Prince Maurice and having fomented the revolts in England against King Charles I. But these are the faults of men, and not of dogmas.  Their opponents do not spare them either, witness the severity used in Saxony against Nicolas Krell and the proceedings of the Jesuits against the Bishop of Ypres’s party.

8.  Mr. Hobbes observes, after Aristotle, that there are two sources for proofs:  reason and authority.  As for reason, he says that he admits the reasons derived from the attributes of God, which he calls argumentative, and the notions whereof are conceivable; but he maintains that there are others wherein one conceives nothing, and which are only expressions by which we aspire to honour God.  But I do not see how one can honour God by expressions that have no meaning.  It may be that with Mr. Hobbes, as with Spinoza, wisdom, goodness, justice are only fictions in relation to God and the universe, since the prime cause, according to them, acts through the necessity of its power, and not by the choice of its wisdom.  That is [399] an opinion whose falsity I have sufficiently proved.  It appears that Mr. Hobbes did not wish to declare himself enough, for fear of causing offence to people; on which point he is to be commended.  It was also on that account, as he says himself, that he had desired that what had passed between the bishop and him in Paris should not be published.  He adds that it is not good to say that an action which God does not will happens, since that is to say in effect that God is lacking in power.  But he adds also at the same time that it is not good either to say the opposite, and to attribute to God that he wills the evil; because that is not seemly, and would appear to accuse God of lack of goodness.  He believes, therefore, that in these matters telling the truth is not advisable.  He would be right if the truth were in the paradoxical opinions that he maintains.  For indeed it appears that according to the opinion of this writer God has no goodness, or rather that that which he calls God is nothing but the blind nature of the mass of material things, which acts according to mathematical laws, following an absolute necessity, as the atoms do in the system of Epicurus.  If God were as the great are sometimes here on earth, it would not be fitting to utter all the truths concerning him.  But God is not as a man, whose designs and actions often must be concealed; rather it is always permissible and reasonable to publish the counsels and the actions of God, because they are always glorious and worthy of praise.  Thus it is always right to utter truths concerning the divinity; one need not anyhow refrain from fear of giving offence.  And I have explained, so it seems to me, in a way which satisfies reason, and does not wound piety, how it is to be understood that God’s will takes effect, and concurs with sin, without compromising his wisdom and his goodness.