It is asserted (2) ‘That hazard’ (chance in English, casus in Latin) ‘produces nothing’, that is, that nothing is produced without cause or reason.  Very right, I admit it, if one thereby intends a real hazard.  For fortune and hazard are only appearances, which spring from ignorance of causes or from disregard of them. (3) ‘That all events have their necessary causes.’ Wrong:  they have their determining causes, whereby one can account for them; but these are not necessary causes.  The contrary might have happened, without implying contradiction. (4) ’That the will of God makes the necessity of all things.’ Wrong:  the will of God produces only contingent things, which could have gone differently, since time, space and matter are indifferent with regard to all kinds of shape and movement.

6. On the other side (according to Mr. Hobbes) it is asserted, (1) ’That man is free’ (absolutely) not only ’to choose what he wills to do, but also to choose what he wills to will.’  That is ill said:  one is not absolute master of one’s will, to change it forthwith, without making use of some means or skill for that purpose. (2) ’When man wills a good action, the will of God co-operates with his, otherwise not.’  That is well said, provided one means that God does not will evil actions, although he wills to permit them, to prevent the occurrence of something which would be worse than these sins. (3) ’That the will can choose whether it wills to will or not.’ Wrong, with regard to present volition. (4) ’That things happen without necessity by chance.’ Wrong:  what happens without necessity [398] does not because of that happen by chance, that is to say, without causes and reasons. (5) ’Notwithstanding that God may foresee that an event will happen, it is not necessary that it happen, since God foresees things, not as futurities and as in their causes, but as present.’  That begins well, and finishes ill.  One is justified in admitting the necessity of the consequence, but one has no reason to resort to the question how the future is present to God:  for the necessity of the consequence does not prevent the event or consequent from being contingent in itself.

7.  Our author thinks that since the doctrine revived by Arminius had been favoured in England by Archbishop Laud and by the Court, and important ecclesiastical promotions had been only for those of that party, this contributed to the revolt which caused the bishop and him to meet in their exile in Paris at the house of Lord Newcastle, and to enter into a discussion.  I would not approve all the measures of Archbishop Laud, who had merit and perhaps also good will, but who appears to have goaded the Presbyterians excessively.  Nevertheless one may say that the revolutions, as much in the Low Countries as in Great Britain, in part arose from the extreme intolerance of the strict party.  One may say also that the defenders of the absolute