I deny the major.  It is true that God could overcome the greatest resistance of the human heart, and indeed he sometimes does so, [386] whether by an inward grace or by the outward circumstances that can greatly influence souls; but he does not always do so.  Whence comes this distinction, someone will say, and wherefore does his goodness appear to be restricted?  The truth is that it would not have been in order always to act in an extraordinary way and to derange the connexion of things, as I have observed already in answering the first objection.  The reasons for this connexion, whereby the one is placed in more favourable circumstances than the other, are hidden in the depths of God’s wisdom:  they depend upon the universal harmony.  The best plan of the universe, which God could not fail to choose, required this.  One concludes thus from the event itself; since God made the universe, it was not possible to do better.  Such management, far from being contrary to goodness, has rather been prompted by supreme goodness itself.  This objection with its solution might have been inferred from what was said with regard to the first objection; but it seemed advisable to touch upon it separately.

OBJECTION VIII

Whoever cannot fail to choose the best is not free.

God cannot fail to choose the best.

Therefore God is not free.

ANSWER

I deny the major of this argument.  Rather is it true freedom, and the most perfect, to be able to make the best use of one’s free will, and always to exercise this power, without being turned aside either by outward force or by inward passions, whereof the one enslaves our bodies and the other our souls.  There is nothing less servile and more befitting the highest degree of freedom than to be always led towards the good, and always by one’s own inclination, without any constraint and without any displeasure.  And to object that God therefore had need of external things is only a sophism.  He creates them freely:  but when he had set before him an end, that of exercising his goodness, his wisdom determined him to choose the means most appropriate for obtaining this end.  To call that a need is to take the term in a sense not usual, which clears it of all imperfection, somewhat as one does when speaking of the wrath of God.

Seneca says somewhere, that God commanded only once, but that he obeys[387] always, because he obeys the laws that he willed to ordain for himself:  semel jussit, semper paret.  But he had better have said, that God always commands and that he is always obeyed:  for in willing he always follows the tendency of his own nature, and all other things always follow his will.  And as this will is always the same one cannot say that he obeys that will only which he formerly had.  Nevertheless, although his will is always indefectible and always tends towards the