of punishment.  If anyone meant a different necessity or impossibility (that is, a necessity only moral or hypothetical, which will be explained presently) it is plain that we would deny him the major stated in the objection.  We might content ourselves with this answer, and demand the proof of the proposition denied:  but I am well pleased to justify my manner of procedure in the present work, in order to make the matter clear and to throw more light on this whole subject, by explaining the necessity that must be rejected and the determination that must be allowed.  The truth is that the necessity contrary to morality, which must be avoided and which would render punishment unjust, is an insuperable necessity, which would render all opposition unavailing, even though one should wish with all one’s heart to avoid the necessary action, and though one should make all possible efforts to that end.  Now it is plain that this is not applicable to voluntary actions, since one would not do them if one did not so desire.  Thus their prevision and predetermination is not absolute, but it presupposes will:  if it is certain that one will do them, it is no less certain that one will will to do them.  These voluntary actions and their results will not happen whatever one may do and whether one will them or not; but they will happen because one will do, and because one will will to do, that which leads to them.  That is involved in prevision and predetermination, and forms the reason thereof.  The necessity of such events is called conditional or hypothetical, or again necessity of consequence, because it presupposes the will and the other requisites.  But the necessity which destroys morality, and renders punishment unjust and reward unavailing, is found in the things that will be whatever one may do and whatever one may will to do:  in a word, it exists in that which is essential.  This it is which is called an absolute necessity.  Thus it avails nothing with regard to what is necessary absolutely to ordain interdicts or commandments, to propose penalties or prizes, to blame or to praise; it will come to pass no more and no less.  In voluntary actions, on the contrary, and in what depends upon them, precepts, armed with power to[382] punish and to reward, very often serve, and are included in the order of causes that make action exist.  Thus it comes about that not only pains and effort but also prayers are effective, God having had even these prayers in mind before he ordered things, and having made due allowance for them.  That is why the precept Ora et labora (Pray and work) remains intact.  Thus not only those who (under the empty pretext of the necessity of events) maintain that one can spare oneself the pains demanded by affairs, but also those who argue against prayers, fall into that which the ancients even in their time called ‘the Lazy Sophism’.  So the predetermination of events by their causes is precisely what contributes to morality instead of destroying it, and the causes