the particular nature of this substance, but in a manner which always expresses all the nature in the universe; and every present perception leads to a new perception, just as every movement that it represents leads to another movement.  But it is impossible that the soul can know clearly its whole nature, and perceive how this innumerable number of small perceptions, piled up or rather concentrated together, shapes itself there:  to that end it must needs know completely the whole universe which is embraced by them, that is, it must needs be a God.

404.  As regards velleities, they are only a very imperfect kind of conditional will.  I would, if I could:  liberet si liceret; and in the case of a velleity, we do not will, properly speaking, to will, but to be able.  That explains why there are none in God; and they must not be confused with antecedent will.  I have explained sufficiently elsewhere that our control over volitions can be exercised only indirectly, and that one would be unhappy if one were sufficiently master in one’s own domain to be able to will without cause, without rhyme or reason.  To complain of not having such a control would be to argue like Pliny, who carps at the power of God because God cannot destroy himself.

405.  I intended to finish here after having met (as it seems to me) all the objections of M. Bayle on this matter that I could find in his works.  But remembering Laurentius Valla’s Dialogue on Free Will, in opposition to Boethius, which I have already mentioned, I thought it would be opportune to quote it in abstract, retaining the dialogue form, and then to continue from where it ends, keeping up the fiction it initiated; and that less with the purpose of enlivening the subject, than in order to explain myself towards the end of my dissertation as clearly as I can, and in a way [366] most likely to be generally understood.  This Dialogue of Valla and his books on Pleasure and the True Good make it plain that he was no less a philosopher than a humanist.  These four books were opposed to the four books on the Consolation of Philosophy by Boethius, and the Dialogue to the fifth book.  A certain Spaniard named Antonio Glarea requests of him elucidation on the difficulty of free will, whereof little is known as it is worthy to be known, for upon it depend justice and injustice, punishment and reward in this life and in the life to come.  Laurentius Valla answers him that we must console ourselves for an ignorance which we share with the whole world, just as one consoles oneself for not having the wings of birds.