324.  M. Bayle himself remarks aptly that freedom of indifference (such as must be admitted) does not exclude inclinations and does not demand equipoise.  He demonstrates amply enough (Reply to the Questions of a Provincial, ch. 139, p. 748 seqq.) that the soul may be compared to a balance, where reasons and inclinations take the place of weights.  According to him, one can explain what passes in our resolutions by the hypothesis that the will of man is like a balance which is at rest when the weights of its two pans are equal, and which always inclines either to one side or the other according to which of the pans is the more heavily laden.  A new reason makes a heavier weight, a new idea shines more brightly than the old; the fear of a heavy penalty prevails over some pleasure; when two passions dispute the ground, it is always the stronger which gains the mastery, unless the other be assisted by reason or by some other [322] contributing passion.  When one flings away merchandise in order to save oneself, the action, which the Schoolmen call mixed, is voluntary and free; and yet love of life indubitably prevails over love of possessions.  Grief arises from remembrance of lost possessions, and one has all the greater difficulty in making one’s resolve, the nearer the approach to even weight in the opposing reasons, as also we see that the balance is determined more promptly when there is a great difference between the weights.

325.  Nevertheless, as very often there are divers courses to choose from, one might, instead of the balance, compare the soul with a force which puts forth effort on various sides simultaneously, but which acts only at the spot where action is easiest or there is least resistance.  For instance, air if it is compressed too firmly in a glass vessel will break it in order to escape.  It puts forth effort at every part, but finally flings itself upon the weakest.  Thus do the inclinations of the soul extend over all the goods that present themselves:  they are antecedent acts of will; but the consequent will, which is their result, is determined in the direction of that which touches most closely.

326.  This ascendancy of inclinations, however, does not prevent man from being master in his own domain, provided that he knows how to make use of his power.  His dominion is that of reason:  he has only to prepare himself in good time to resist the passions, and he will be capable of checking the vehemence of the most furious.  Let us assume that Augustus, about to give orders for putting to death Fabius Maximus, acts, as is his wont, upon the advice a philosopher had given him, to recite the Greek alphabet before doing anything in the first heat of his anger:  this reflexion will be capable of saving the life of Fabius and the glory of Augustus.  But without some fortunate reflexion, which one owes sometimes to a special divine mercy, or without some skill acquired beforehand, like that of Augustus, calculated to make us reflect fittingly as to time and place, passion will prevail over reason.  The driver is master over the horses if he controls them as he should, and as he can; but there are occasions when he becomes negligent, and then for a time he will have to let go the reins: