luck than of their prudence.  The pagans, and particularly the poets (Homer especially), determined their heroes’ acts by divine promptings.  The hero of the Aeneid proceeds only under the direction of a God.  It was very great praise offered to the Emperors if one said that they were victorious both through their troops and through their gods whom they lent to [318] their generals:  ‘Te copias, te consilium et tuos praebente Divos,’ said Horace.  The generals fought under the auspices of the Emperors, as if trusting to the Emperor’s good luck, for subordinate officers had no rights regarding the auspices.  One takes credit to oneself for being a favourite of heaven, one rates oneself more highly for the possession of good fortune than of talent.  There are no people that think themselves more fortunate than the mystics, who imagine that they keep still while God acts within them.

318.  ‘On the other hand’, M. Bayle adds (ch. 83), ’a Stoic philosopher, who attaches to everything an inevitable necessity, is as susceptible as another man to the pleasure of having chosen well.  And every man of sense will find that, far from taking pleasure in the thought of having deliberated long and finally chosen the most honourable course, one feels incredible satisfaction in persuading oneself that one is so firmly rooted in the love of virtue that without the slightest resistance one would repel a temptation.  A man to whom is suggested the doing of a deed contrary to his duty, his honour and his conscience, who answers forthwith that he is incapable of such a crime, and who is certainly not capable of it, is far more contented with himself than if he asked for time to consider it, and were for some hours in a state of indecision as to which course to take.  One is on many occasions regretful over not being able to make up one’s mind between two courses, and one would be well pleased that the counsel of a good friend, or some succour from above, should impel us to make a good choice.’  All that demonstrates for us the advantage a determinate judgement has over that vague indifference which leaves us in uncertainty.  But indeed I have proved sufficiently that only ignorance or passion has power to keep us in doubt, and have thus given the reason why God is never in doubt.  The nearer one comes to him, the more perfect is freedom, and the more it is determined by the good and by reason.  The character of Cato, of whom Velleius said that it was impossible for him to perform a dishonourable action, will always be preferred to that of a man who is capable of wavering.

319.  I have been well pleased to present and to support these arguments of M. Bayle against vague indifference, as much for the elucidation of the subject as to confront him with himself, and to demonstrate that he ought therefore not to complain of the alleged necessity imposed upon God, [319] of choosing the best way that is possible.  For either God will act through a vague indifference and at random, or