315.  Even so some capricious man, fancying that it is ignominious for him to follow the advice of his friends or his servants, might prefer the satisfaction of contradicting them to the profit he could derive from their counsel.  It may happen, however, that in a matter of small moment a wise man acts irregularly and against his own interest in order to thwart another who tries to restrain him or direct him, or that he may disconcert those who watch his steps.  It is even well at times to imitate Brutus by concealing one’s wit, and even to feign madness, as David did before the King of the Philistines.

316.  M. Bayle admirably supplements his remarks with the object of showing that to act against the judgement of the understanding would be a great imperfection.  He observes (p. 225) that, even according to the [317] Molinists, ’the understanding which does its DUTY well indicates that which is THE BEST’.  He introduces God (ch. 91, p. 227) saying to our first parents in the Garden of Eden:  ’I have given you my knowledge, the faculty of judging things, and full power to dispose your wills.  I shall give you instructions and orders; but the free will that I have bestowed upon you is of such a nature that you have equal power (according to circumstances) to obey me and to disobey me.  You will be tempted:  if you make a good use of your freedom you will be happy; and if you use it ill you will be unhappy.  It is for you to see if you wish to ask of me, as a new grace, either that I permit you to abuse your freedom when you shall make resolve to do so, or that I prevent you from doing so.  Consider carefully, I give you four and twenty hours.  Do you not clearly understand’ (adds M. Bayle) ’that their reason, which had not yet been obscured by sin, would have made them conclude that they must ask God, as the crowning point of the favours wherewith he had honoured them, not to permit them to destroy themselves by an ill use of their powers?  And must one not admit that if Adam, through wrongly making it a point of honour to order his own goings, had refused a divine direction that would have safeguarded his happiness, he would have been the prototype of all such as Phaeton and Icarus?  He would have been well-nigh as ungodly as the Ajax of Sophocles, who wished to conquer without the aid of the gods, and who said that the most craven would put their enemies to flight with such aid.’

317.  M. Bayle also shows (ch. 80) that one congratulates oneself no less, or even takes more credit to oneself, for having been aided from above, than for owing one’s happiness to one’s own choice.  And if one does well through having preferred a tumultuous instinct, which arose suddenly, to reasons maturely considered, one feels an extraordinary joy in this; for one assumes that either God, or our Guardian Angel, or something or other which one pictures to oneself under the vague name of good luck has impelled us thereto.  Indeed, Sulla and Caesar boasted more of their good