313.  ’Not only does the doctrine that subjects the will to the final acts of the understanding give a more favourable idea of the state of the soul, but it shows also that it is easier to lead man to happiness along that road than along the road of indifference.  It will suffice to enlighten his mind upon his true interests, and straightway his will will comply with the judgements that reason shall have pronounced.  But if he has a freedom independent of reason and of the quality of objects clearly recognized, he will be the most intractable of all animals, and it will never be possible to rely upon making him choose the right course.  All the counsels, all the arguments in the world may prove unavailing; you will give him explanations, you will convince his mind, and yet his will will play the haughty madam and remain motionless as a rock.  Vergil, Aen., lib. 6, v. 470: 

  Non magis incepto vultum sermone movetur,
  Quam si dura silex, aut stet Marpesia cautes.

A caprice, an empty whim will make her stiffen against reasons of all kinds; it will not please her to love her clearly recognized good, it will please her to hate it.  Do you consider such a faculty, sir, to be the richest present God can have made to man, and the sole instrument of our happiness?  Is it not rather an obstacle to our felicity?  Is there cause for boasting in being able to say:  “I have scorned all the judgements of [316] my reason, and I have followed an altogether different path, simply from considerations of my own good pleasure?” With what regrets would one not be torn, in that case, if the determination made had an ill result?  Such a freedom would therefore be more harmful than profitable to men, because the understanding would not present all the goodness of the objects clearly enough to deprive the will of the power of rejection.  It would be therefore infinitely better for man to be always of necessity determined by the judgement of the understanding, than to permit the will to suspend its action.  For by this means it would achieve its aim with greater ease and certainty.’

314.  Upon this discourse I make the further observation, that it is very true that a freedom of indifference, undefined and without any determining reason, would be as harmful, and even objectionable, as it is impracticable and chimerical.  The man who wished to behave thus, or at the least appear to be acting without due cause, would most certainly be looked upon as irrational.  But it is very true also that the thing is impossible, when it is taken strictly in accordance with the assumption.  As soon as one tries to give an example of it one misses one’s aim and stumbles upon the case of a man who, while he does not come to a decision without cause, does so rather under the influence of inclination or passion than of judgement.  As soon as one says:  ’I scorn the judgements of my reason simply from considerations of my own good pleasure, it pleases me to behave thus’, it is as if one were to say:  I prefer my inclination to my interest, my pleasure to my profit.