they teach constantly that as the true is the object of [313] the understanding, so the good is the object of the will.  So likewise they teach that as the understanding can never affirm anything save that which is shown to it under the semblance of truth, the will can never love anything which to it does not appear to be good.  One never believes the false as such, and one never loves evil as evil.  There is in the understanding a natural determination towards the true in general, and towards each individual truth clearly recognized.  There is in the will a natural determination towards good in general; whence many philosophers conclude that from the moment when individual goods are clearly recognized by us we are of necessity compelled to love them.  The understanding suspends its actions only when its objects show themselves obscurely, so that there is cause for doubt as to whether they are false or true.  That leads many persons to the conclusion that the will remains in equipoise only when the soul is uncertain whether the object presented to it is a good with regard to it; but that also, the moment the soul decides in the affirmative, it of necessity clings to that object until other judgements of the mind determine it otherwise.  Those who expound freedom in this fashion think to find therein plentiful enough material for merit or demerit.  For they assume that these judgements of the mind proceed from a free attention of the soul in examining the objects, comparing them together, and discriminating between them.  I must not forget that there are very learned men’ (such as Bellarmine, lib. 3, De Gratia et Libero Arbitrio, c. 8, et 9, and Cameron, in Responsione ad Epistolam Viri Docti, id est Episcopii) ’who maintain with very cogent reasons that the will always of necessity follows the last practical act of the understanding.’

310.  One must make some observations on this discourse.  A very clear recognition of the best determines the will; but it does not necessitate it, properly speaking.  One must always distinguish between the necessary and the certain or infallible, as I have already observed more than once, and distinguish metaphysical necessity from moral necessity.  I think also that it is only God’s will which always follows the judgements of the understanding:  all intelligent creatures are subject to some passions, or to perceptions at least, that are not composed entirely of what I call adequate ideas.  And although in the blessed these passions always tend towards the true good, by virtue of the laws of Nature and the system of things pre-established in relation to them, yet this does not always [314] happen in such a way that they have a perfect knowledge of that good.  It is the same with them as with us, who do not always understand the reason for our instincts.  The angels and the blessed are created beings, even as we are, in whom there is always some confused perception mingled with distinct knowledge.  Suarez said