295.  This is how M. Bayle combats those inward experiences, whereon [306] the Cartesians make freedom rest:  but he begins by reflexions with which I cannot agree.  ‘Those who do not make profound examination’, he says (Dictionary, art.  ‘Helen.’, lit. [Greek:  TD]), ’of that which passes within them easily persuade themselves that they are free, and that, if their will prompts them to evil, it is their fault, it is through a choice whereof they are the masters.  Those who judge otherwise are persons who have studied with care the springs and the circumstances of their actions, and who have thought over the progress of their soul’s impulses.  Those persons usually have doubts about their free will, and even come to persuade themselves that their reason and mind are slaves, without power to resist the force that carries them along where they would not go.  It was principally persons of this kind who ascribed to the gods the cause of their evil deeds.’

296.  These words remind me of those of Chancellor Bacon, who says that a little philosophy inclineth us away from God, but that depth in philosophy bringeth men’s minds about to him.  It is the same with those who reflect upon their actions:  it appears to them at first that all we do is only impulsion from others, and that all we apprehend comes from without through the senses, and is traced upon the void of our mind tanquam in tabula rasa.  But more profound meditation shows us that all (even perceptions and passions) comes to us from our own inner being, with complete spontaneity.

297.  Yet M. Bayle cites poets who pretend to exonerate men by laying the blame upon the gods.  Medea in Ovid speaks thus: 

      Frustra, Medea, repugnas,
  Nescio quid Deus obstat, ait.

And a little later Ovid makes her add: 

  Sed trahit invitam nova vis, aliudque Cupido,
  Mens aliud suadet; video meliora proboque,
  Deteriora sequor.

But one could set against that a passage from Vergil, who makes Nisus say with far more reason: 

  Di ne hunc ardorem mentibus addunt,
  Euryale, an sua cuique Deus fit dira cupido?

298.  Herr Wittich seems to have thought that in reality our independence is only apparent.  For in his Diss. de providentia Dei actuali (n. 61) [307] he makes free will consist in our being inclined towards the objects that present themselves to our soul for affirmation or denial, love or hate, in such a way that we do not feel we are being determined by any outward force.  He adds that it is when God himself causes our volitions that we act with most freedom; and that the more efficacious and powerful God’s action is upon us, the more we are masters of our actions.  ’Quia enim Deus operatur ipsum velle, quo efficacius operatur, eo magis volumus; quod autem, cum volumus, facimus, id maxime habemus in nostra potestate.’