287.  Will is proportionate to the sense we have of the good, and follows the sense which prevails.  ’Si utrumque tantundem diligimus, nihil horum dabimus.  Item:  Quod amplius nos delectat, secundum id operemur necesse est’ (in c. 5, Ad Gal.).  I have explained already how, despite all that, we have indeed a great power over our will.  St. Augustine takes it somewhat differently, and in a way that does not go far, when he says that nothing is so much within our power as the action of our will.  And he gives a reason which is almost tautological:  for (he says) this action is ready at the moment when we will.  ’Nihil tam in nostra potestate est, quam ipsa voluntas, ea enim mox ut volumus praesto est’ (lib. 3, De Lib.  Arb., c. 3; lib. 5, De Civ.  Dei, c. 10).  But that only means that we will when we will, and not that we will that which we wish to will.  There is more reason for saying with him:  ‘aut voluntas non est, aut libera dicenda est’ (d. 1, 3, c. 3); and that what inclines the will towards good infallibly, or certainly, does not prevent it from being free.  ’Perquam absurdum est, ut ideo dicamus non pertinere ad voluntatem [libertatem] nostram, quod beati esse volumus, quia id omnino nolle non possumus, nescio qua bona constrictione naturae.  Nec dicere audemus ideo Deum non voluntatem [libertatem], sed necessitatem habere justitiae, quia non potest velle peccare.  Certe Deus ipse numquid quia peccare non potest, ideo liberum arbitrium habere negandus est?’ (De Nat. et Grat., c. 46, 47, 48, 49).  He also says aptly, that God gives the first good impulse, but that afterwards man acts also.  ‘Aguntur ut agant, non ut ipsi nihil agant’ (De Corrept., c. 2).

288.  I have proved that free will is the proximate cause of the evil of guilt, and consequently of the evil of punishment; although it is true that the original imperfection of creatures, which is already presented in the eternal ideas, is the first and most remote cause.  M. Bayle [303] nevertheless always disputes this use of the notion of free will; he will not have the cause of evil ascribed to it.  One must listen to his objections, but first it will be well to throw further light on the nature of freedom.  I have shown that freedom, according to the definition required in the schools of theology, consists in intelligence, which involves a clear knowledge of the object of deliberation, in spontaneity, whereby we determine, and in contingency, that is, in the exclusion of logical or metaphysical necessity.  Intelligence is, as it were, the soul of freedom, and the rest is as its body and foundation.  The free substance is self-determining and that according to the motive of good perceived by the understanding, which inclines it without compelling it:  and all the conditions of freedom are comprised in these few words.  It is nevertheless well to point out that the imperfection present in our knowledge and our spontaneity, and the infallible determination that is involved in our contingency, destroy neither freedom nor contingency.