283.  In the dogmas themselves held by the Disciples of St. Augustine I cannot approve the damnation of unregenerate children, nor in general damnation resulting from original sin alone.  Nor can I believe that God condemns those who are without the necessary light.  One may believe, with many theologians, that men receive more aid than we are aware of, were it only when they are at the point of death.  It does not appear necessary either that all those who are saved should always be saved through a grace efficacious of itself, independently of circumstances.  Also I consider it unnecessary to say that all the virtues of the pagans were false or that all their actions were sins; though it be true that what does not spring from faith, or from the uprightness of the soul before God, is infected with sin, at least virtually.  Finally I hold that God cannot act as if at random by an absolutely absolute decree, or by a will independent of reasonable motives.  And I am persuaded that he is always actuated, in the dispensation of his grace, by reasons wherein the nature of the objects participates.  Otherwise he would not act in accordance with wisdom.  I grant nevertheless that these reasons are not of necessity bound up with the good or the less evil natural qualities of men, as if God gave his grace only according to these good qualities.  Yet I hold, as I have explained already here, that these qualities are taken into consideration like all the other circumstances, since nothing can be neglected in the designs of supreme wisdom.

284.  Save for these points, and some few others, where St. Augustine appears obscure or even repellent, it seems as though one can conform to his system.  He states that from the substance of God only a God can proceed, and that thus the creature is derived from nothingness (Augustine De Lib.  Arb., lib. 1, c. 2).  That is what makes the creature imperfect, faulty and corruptible (De Genesi ad Lit., c. 15, Contra Epistolam Manichaei, c. 36).  Evil comes not from nature, but from evil will (Augustine, in the whole book On the Nature of Good).  God can command nothing that would be impossible.  ’Firmissime creditur Deum justum et bonum impossibilia non potuisse praecipere’ (Lib. de Nat. et Grat., c. 43, p. 69).  Nemo peccat in eo, quod caveri non potest (lib. 3, De Lib.  Arb., c. 16, 17, lib. 1 Retract. c. 11, 13, 15).  Under a just God, none can be unhappy who deserves not so to be, ’neque sub Deo justo miser esse [301] quisquam, nisi mereatur, potest’ (lib. 1, c. 39).  Free will cannot carry out God’s commands without the aid of grace (Ep. ad Hilar.  Caesaraugustan.).  We know that grace is not given according to deserts (Ep. 106, 107, 120).  Man in the state of innocence had the aid necessary to enable him to do good if he wished; but the wish depended on free will, ’habebat adjutorium, per quod posset, et sine quo non vellet, sed non adjutorium quo vellet’ (Lib. de Corrept.,