280.  The system of those who call themselves Disciples of St. Augustine is not far removed from this, provided one exclude certain obnoxious things, whether in the expressions or in the dogmas themselves.  In the expressions I find that it is principally the use of terms like [298] ‘necessary’ or ‘contingent’, ‘possible’ or ‘impossible’, which sometimes gives a handle and causes much ado.  That is why, as Herr Loescher the younger aptly observed in a learned dissertation on the Paroxysms of the Absolute Decree, Luther desired, in his book On the Will in Bondage, to find a word more fitting for that which he wished to express than the word necessity.  Speaking generally, it appears more reasonable and more fitting to say that obedience to God’s precepts is always possible, even for the unregenerate; that the grace of God is always resistible, even in those most holy, and that freedom is exempt not only from constraint but also from necessity, although it be never without infallible certainty or without inclining determination.

281.  Nevertheless there is on the other hand a sense wherein it would be permitted to say, in certain conjunctures, that the power to do good is often lacking, even in the just; that sins are often necessary, even in the regenerate; that it is impossible sometimes for one not to sin; that grace is irresistible; that freedom is not exempt from necessity.  But these expressions are less exact and less pleasing in the circumstances that prevail about us to-day.  They are also in general more open to misuse; and moreover they savour somewhat of the speech of the people, where terms are employed with great latitude.  There are, however, circumstances which render them acceptable and even serviceable.  It is the case that sacred and orthodox writers, and even the holy Scriptures, have made use of expressions on both sides, and no real contradiction has arisen, any more than between St. Paul and St. James, or any error on either side that might be attributable to the ambiguity of the terms.  One is so well accustomed to these various ways of speaking that often one is put to it to say precisely which sense is the more ordinary and the more natural, and even that more intended by the author (quis sensus magis naturalis, obvius, intentus).  For the same writer has different aims in different passages, and the same ways of speaking are more or less accepted or acceptable before or after the decision of some great man or of some authority that one respects and follows.  As a result of this one may well authorize or ban, as opportunity arises and at certain times, certain expressions; but it makes no difference to the sense, or to the content of faith, if sufficient explanations of the terms are not added.