263.  M. Bayle says that this observation of Maimonides is not to the point, because the question is whether among men evil exceeds good.  But, upon consideration of the Rabbi’s words, I find that the question he formulates is general, and that he wished to refute those who decide it on one particular motive derived from the evils of the human race, as if all had been made for man; and it seems as though the author whom he refutes spoke also of good and evil in general.  Maimonides is right in saying that if one took into account the littleness of man in relation to the universe one would comprehend clearly that the predominance of evil, even though it prevailed among men, need not on that account occur among the angels, nor among the heavenly bodies, nor among the elements and inanimate compounds, nor among many kinds of animals.  I have shown elsewhere that in supposing that the number of the damned exceeds that of the saved (a supposition which is nevertheless not altogether certain) one might admit that there is more evil than good in respect of the human kind known to us.  But I pointed out that that neither precludes the existence of incomparably more good than evil, both moral and physical, in rational creatures in general, nor prevents the city of God, which contains all creatures, from being the most perfect state.  So also on consideration of the metaphysical good and evil which is in all substances, whether endowed with or devoid of intelligence, and which taken in such scope would include physical good and moral good, one must say that the universe, such as it actually is, must be the best of all systems.

[289] 264.  Moreover, M. Bayle will not have it that our transgression should have anything to do with the consideration of our sufferings.  He is right when it is simply a matter of appraising these sufferings; but the case is not the same when one asks whether they should be ascribed to God, this indeed being the principal cause of M. Bayle’s difficulties when he places reason or experience in opposition to religion.  I know that he is wont to say that it is of no avail to resort to our free will, since his objections tend also to prove that the misuse of free will must no less be laid to the account of God, who has permitted it and who has co-operated therein.  He states it as a maxim that for one difficulty more or less one must not abandon a system.  This he advances especially in favour of the methods of the strict and the dogma of the Supralapsarians.  For he supposes that one can subscribe to their opinion, although he leaves all the difficulties in their entirety, because the other systems, albeit they put an end to some of the difficulties, cannot meet them all.  I hold that the true system I have expounded satisfies all.  Nevertheless, even were that not so, I confess that I cannot relish this maxim of M. Bayle’s, and I should prefer a system which would remove a great portion of the difficulties, to one which would