[271] 232.  M. Bayle goes on (p. 892):  ’The subtle Scotus asserts with much discernment that if God had no freedom of indifference no creature could have this kind of freedom.’  I agree provided it is not meant as an indifference of equipoise, where there is no reason inclining more to one side than the other.  M. Bayle acknowledges (farther on in chapter 168, p. 1111) that what is termed indifference does not exclude prevenient inclinations and pleasures.  It suffices therefore that there be no metaphysical necessity in the action which is termed free, that is to say, it suffices that a choice be made between several courses possible.

233.  He goes on again in the said chapter 157, p. 893:  ’If God is not determined to create the world by a free motion of his goodness, but by the interests of his glory, which he loves by necessity, and which is the only thing he loves, for it is not different from his substance; and if the love that he has for himself has compelled him to show forth his glory through the most fitting means, and if the fall of man was this same means, it is evident that this fall happened entirely by necessity and that the obedience of Eve and Adam to God’s commands was impossible.’  Still the same error.  The love that God bears to himself is essential to him, but the love for his glory, or the will to acquire his glory, is not so by any means:  the love he has for himself did not impel him by necessity to actions without; they were free; and since there were possible plans whereby the first parents should not sin, their sin was therefore not necessary.  Finally, I say in effect what M. Bayle acknowledges here, ’that God resolved to create the world by a free motion of his goodness’; and I add that this same motion prompted him to the best.

234.  The same answer holds good against this statement of M. Bayle’s (ch. 165, p. 1071):  ’The means most appropriate for attaining an end is of necessity one alone’ (that is very well said, at least for the cases where God has chosen).  ’Therefore if God was prompted irresistibly to employ this means, he employed it by necessity.’ (He was certainly prompted thereto, he was determined, or rather he determined himself thereto:  but that which is certain is not always necessary, or altogether irresistible; the thing might have gone otherwise, but that did not happen, and with good reason.  God chose between different courses all possible:  thus, metaphysically speaking, he could have chosen or done what was not the best; but he could not morally speaking have done so.  Let us make use of a comparison [272] from geometry.  The best way from one point to another (leaving out of account obstacles and other considerations accidental to the medium) is one alone:  it is that one which passes by the shortest line, which is the straight line.  Yet there are innumerable ways from one point to another.  There is therefore no necessity which binds me to go by the straight line; but as soon as I choose the