191.  But again it is easy to answer.  This so-called fatum, which [247] binds even the Divinity, is nothing but God’s own nature, his own understanding, which furnishes the rules for his wisdom and his goodness; it is a happy necessity, without which he would be neither good nor wise.  Is it to be desired that God should not be bound to be perfect and happy?  Is our condition, which renders us liable to fail, worth envying?  And should we not be well pleased to exchange it for sinlessness, if that depended upon us?  One must be indeed weary of life to desire the freedom to destroy oneself and to pity the Divinity for not having that freedom.  M. Bayle himself reasons thus elsewhere against those who laud to the skies an extravagant freedom which they assume in the will, when they would make the will independent of reason.

192.  Moreover, M. Bayle wonders ’that the divine understanding in the infinity of its ideas always and at the outset hits upon their perfect conformity with their objects, without the guidance of any cognition’.  This objection is null and void.  Every distinct idea is, through its distinctness, in conformity with its object, and in God there are distinct ideas only.  At first, moreover, the object exists nowhere; but when it comes into existence, it will be formed according to this idea.  Besides, M. Bayle knows very well that the divine understanding has no need of time for seeing the connexion of things.  All trains of reasoning are in God in a transcendent form, and they preserve an order amongst them in his understanding, as well as in ours:  but with him it is only an order and a priority of nature, whereas with us there is a priority of time.  It is therefore not to be wondered at that he who penetrates all things at one stroke should always strike true at the outset; and it must not be said that he succeeds without the guidance of any cognition.  On the contrary, it is because his knowledge is perfect that his voluntary actions are also perfect.

193.  Up to now I have shown that the Will of God is not independent of the rules of Wisdom, although indeed it is a matter for surprise that one should have been constrained to argue about it, and to do battle for a truth so great and so well established.  But it is hardly less surprising that there should be people who believe that God only half observes these rules, and does not choose the best, although his wisdom causes him to recognize it; and, in a word, that there should be writers who hold that God could have done better.  That is more or less the error of the famous Alfonso, King of Castile, who was elected King of the Romans by [248] certain Electors, and originated the astronomical tables that bear his name.  This prince is reported to have said that if God in making the world had consulted him he would have given God good advice.  Apparently the Ptolemaic system, which prevailed at that time, was displeasing to him.