what contradiction would there be if Spinoza had died in Leyden?  Would Nature then have been less perfect, less wise, less powerful?’ He confuses here what is impossible because it implies contradiction with what cannot happen because it is not meet to be chosen.  It is true that there would have been no contradiction in the supposition that Spinoza died in Leyden and not at The Hague; there would have been nothing so possible:  the matter was therefore indifferent in respect of the power of God.  But one must not suppose that any event, however small it be, can be regarded as indifferent in respect of his wisdom and his goodness.  Jesus Christ has said divinely well that everything is numbered, even to the hairs of our head.  Thus the wisdom of God did not permit that this event whereof M. Bayle speaks should happen otherwise than it happened, not as if by itself it would have been more deserving of choice, but on account of its connexion with that entire sequence of the universe which deserved to be given preference.  To say that what has already happened was of no interest to the wisdom of God, and[236] thence to infer that it is therefore not necessary, is to make a false assumption and argue incorrectly to a true conclusion.  It is confusing what is necessary by moral necessity, that is, according to the principle of Wisdom and Goodness, with what is so by metaphysical and brute necessity, which occurs when the contrary implies contradiction.  Spinoza, moreover, sought a metaphysical necessity in events.  He did not think that God was determined by his goodness and by his perfection (which this author treated as chimeras in relation to the universe), but by the necessity of his nature; just as the semicircle is bound to enclose only right angles, without either knowing or willing this.  For Euclid demonstrated that all angles enclosed between two straight lines drawn from the extremities of the diameter towards a point on the circumference of the circle are of necessity right angles, and that the contrary implies contradiction.

175.  There are people who have gone to the other extreme:  under the pretext of freeing the divine nature from the yoke of necessity they wished to regard it as altogether indifferent, with an indifference of equipoise.  They did not take into account that just as metaphysical necessity is preposterous in relation to God’s actions ad extra, so moral necessity is worthy of him.  It is a happy necessity which obliges wisdom to do good, whereas indifference with regard to good and evil would indicate a lack of goodness or of wisdom.  And besides, the indifference which would keep the will in a perfect equipoise would itself be a chimera, as has been already shown:  it would offend against the great principle of the determinant reason.