157.  The devils were angels like the rest before their fall, and it is thought that their leader was one of the chief among angels; but Scripture is not explicit enough on that point.  The passage of the Apocalypse that speaks of the struggle with the Dragon, as of a vision, leaves much in doubt, and does not sufficiently develop a subject which by the other sacred writers is hardly mentioned.  It is not in place here to enter into this discussion, and one must still admit that the common opinion agrees best with the sacred text.  M. Bayle examines some replies of St. Basil, of Lactantius and others on the origin of evil.  As, however, they are concerned with physical evil, I postpone discussion thereof, and I will proceed with the examination of the difficulties over the moral cause of moral evil, which arise in several passages of the works of our gifted author.

[222] 158.  He disputes the permission of this evil, he would wish one to admit that God wills it.  He quotes these words of Calvin (on Genesis, ch. 3):  ’The ears of some are offended when one says that God willed it.  But I ask you, what else is the permission of him who is entitled to forbid, or rather who has the thing in his own hands, but an act of will?’ M. Bayle explains these words of Calvin, and those which precede them, as if he admitted that God willed the fall of Adam, not in so far as it was a crime, but under some other conception that is unknown to us.  He quotes casuists who are somewhat lax, who say that a son can desire the death of his father, not in so far as it is an evil for himself but in so far as it is a good for his heirs (Reply to the Questions of a Provincial, ch. 147, p. 850).  It seems to me that Calvin only says that God willed man’s fall for some reason unknown to us.  In the main, when it is a question of a decisive will, that is, of a decree, these distinctions are useless:  one wills the action with all its qualities, if it is true that one wills it.  But when it is a crime, God can only will the permission of it:  the crime is neither an end nor a means, it is only a conditio sine qua non; thus it is not the object of a direct will, as I have already demonstrated above.  God cannot prevent it without acting against what he owes to himself, without doing something that would be worse than the crime of man, without violating the rule of the best; and that would be to destroy divinity, as I have already observed.  God is therefore bound by a moral necessity, which is in himself, to permit moral evil in creatures.  There is precisely the case wherein the will of a wise mind is only permissive.  I have already said this:  he is bound to permit the crime of others when he cannot prevent it without himself failing in that which he owes to himself.