It is true that God makes of matter and of spirits whatever he wills; but he is like a good sculptor, who will make from his block of marble only that which he judges to be the best, and who judges well.  God makes of matter the most excellent of all possible machines; he makes of spirits the most excellent of all governments conceivable; and over and above all that, he establishes for their union the most perfect of all harmonies, [202] according to the system I have proposed.  Now since physical evil and moral evil occur in this perfect work, one must conclude (contrary to M. Bayle’s assurance here) that otherwise a still greater evil would have been altogether inevitable.  This great evil would be that God would have chosen ill if he had chosen otherwise than he has chosen.  It is true that God is infinitely powerful; but his power is indeterminate, goodness and wisdom combined determine him to produce the best.  M. Bayle makes elsewhere an objection which is peculiar to him, which he derives from the opinions of the modern Cartesians.  They say that God could have given to souls what thoughts he would, without making them depend upon any relation to the body:  by this means souls would be spared a great number of evils which only spring from derangement of the body.  More will be said of this later; now it is sufficient to bear in mind that God cannot establish a system ill-connected and full of dissonances.  It is to some extent the nature of souls to represent bodies.

131.  XVI.  ’One is just as much the cause of an event when one brings it about in moral ways, as when one brings it about in physical ways.  A Minister of State, who, without going out of his study, and simply by utilizing the passions of the leaders of a faction, overthrew all their plots, would thus be bringing about the ruin of this faction, no less than if he destroyed it by a surprise attack.’

I have nothing to say against this maxim.  Evil is always attributed to moral causes, and not always to physical causes.  Here I observe simply that if I could not prevent the sin of others except by committing a sin myself, I should be justified in permitting it, and I should not be accessary thereto, or its moral cause.  In God, every fault would represent a sin; it would be even more than sin, for it would destroy Divinity.  And it would be a great fault in him not to choose the best.  I have said so many times.  He would then prevent sin by something worse than all sins.

132.  XVII.  ’It is all the same whether one employ a necessary cause, or employ a free cause while choosing the moments when one knows it to be determined.  If I imagine that gunpowder has the power to ignite or not to ignite when fire touches it, and if I know for certain that it will be disposed to ignite at eight o’clock in the morning, I shall be just as much the cause of its effects if I apply the fire to it at that hour, as I should be in assuming, as is the case, that it is a necessary