(Compare this passage of Aristotle, Rhetor., 1. 2, c. 23, p. m. 446:  [Greek:  hoion ei doie an tis tini hina aphelomenos leipesei; hothen kai tout’ eiretai,]

  [Greek:  pollois ho daimon ou kat’ eunoian pheron]
  [Greek:  Megala didosin eutychemat’, all’ hina]
  [Greek:  tas symphoras labosin epiphanesteras.]

[196] Id est:  Veluti si quis alicui aliquid det, ut (postea) hoc (ipsi) erepto (ipsum) afficiat dolore.  Unde etiam illud est dictum: 

  Bona magna multis non amicus dat Deus,
  Insigniore ut rursus his privet malo.)

All these objections depend almost on the same sophism; they change and mutilate the fact, they only half record things:  God has care for men, he loves the human race, he wishes it well, nothing so true.  Yet he allows men to fall, he often allows them to perish, he gives them goods that tend towards their destruction; and when he makes someone happy, it is after many sufferings:  where is his affection, where is his goodness or again where is his power?  Vain objections, which suppress the main point, which ignore the fact that it is of God one speaks.  It is as though one were speaking of a mother, a guardian, a tutor, whose well-nigh only care is concerned with the upbringing, the preservation, the happiness of the person in question, and who neglect their duty.  God takes care of the universe, he neglects nothing, he chooses what is best on the whole.  If in spite of all that someone is wicked and unhappy, it behoved him to be so.  God (so they say) could have given happiness to all, he could have given it promptly and easily, and without causing himself any inconvenience, for he can do all.  But should he?  Since he does not so, it is a sign that he had to act altogether differently.  If we infer from this either that God only regretfully, and owing to lack of power, fails to make men happy and to give the good first of all and without admixture of evil, or else that he lacks the good will to give it unreservedly and for good and all, then we are comparing our true God with the God of Herodotus, full of envy, or with the demon of the poet whose iambics Aristotle quotes, and I have just translated into Latin, who gives good things in order that he may cause more affliction by taking them away.  That would be trifling with God in perpetual anthropomorphisms, representing him as a man who must give himself up completely to one particular business, whose goodness must be chiefly exercised upon those objects alone which are known to us, and who lacks either aptitude or good will.  God is not lacking therein, he could do the good that we would desire; he even wishes it, taking it separately, but he must not do it in preference to other greater goods which are opposed to it.  Moreover, one has no cause to complain of the fact that usually [197] one attains salvation only through many sufferings, and by bearing the cross of Jesus Christ.  These evils serve to make the elect imitators of their master, and to increase their happiness.