What was said at the end of the remark on the preceding maxim ought to be repeated here, and is sufficient to counter the present maxim.  Moreover, the author is still presupposing that false maxim advanced as the third, stating that the happiness of rational creatures is the sole aim of God.  If that were so, perhaps neither sin nor unhappiness would ever occur, even by concomitance.  God would have chosen a sequence of possibles where all these evils would be excluded.  But God would fail in what is due to the universe, that is, in what he owes to himself.  If there were only spirits they would be without the required connexion, without the order of time and place.  This order demands matter, movement and its laws; to adjust these to spirits in the best possible way means to return to our world.  When one looks at things only in the mass, one imagines to be practicable a thousand things that cannot properly take place.  To wish that God should not give free will to rational creatures is to wish that there be none of these creatures; and to wish that God should prevent them from misusing it is to wish that there be none but these creatures alone, together with what was made for them only.  If God had none but these creatures in view, he would doubtless prevent them from destroying themselves.  One may say in a sense, however, that God has given to these creatures the art of always making good use of their free will, for the natural light of reason is this art.  But it would be necessary always to have the will to do good, and often creatures lack the means of giving themselves the will they ought to have; often they even lack the will to use those means which indirectly give a good will.  Of this I have already spoken more than once.  This fault must be admitted, and one must even acknowledge that God would perhaps have been able to exempt creatures from that fault, since there is nothing to prevent, so it seems, the existence of some whose nature it would be always to have good will.  But I reply that it is not necessary, and that it was not feasible for all rational creatures to have so great a perfection,[193] and such as would bring them so close to the Divinity.  It may even be that that can only be made possible by a special divine grace.  But in this case, would it be proper for God to grant it to all, that is, always to act miraculously in respect of all rational creatures?  Nothing would be less rational than these perpetual miracles.  There are degrees among creatures:  the general order requires it.  And it appears quite consistent with the order of divine government that the great privilege of strengthening in the good should be granted more easily to those who had a good will when they were in a more imperfect state, in the state of struggle and of pilgrimage, in Ecclesia militante, in statu viatorum.  The good angels themselves were not created incapable of sin.  Nevertheless I would not dare to assert that there are no blessed creatures born, or such