Tolluntur in altum, Ut lapsu graviore ruant.

But to say that God should not give a good which he knows an evil will will abuse, when the general plan of things demands that he give it; or again to say that he should give certain means for preventing it, contrary to this same general order:  that is to wish (as I have observed already) that God himself become blameworthy in order to prevent man from being so.  To object, as people do here, that the goodness of God would be smaller than that of another benefactor who would give a more useful gift, is to overlook the fact that the goodness of a benefactor is not measured by a single benefit.  It may well be that a gift from a private person is greater than one from a prince, but the gifts of this private person all taken together will be much inferior to the prince’s gifts all together.  Thus one can esteem fittingly the good things done by God only when one considers their whole extent by relating them to the entire universe.  Moreover, one may say that the gifts given in the expectation that they will harm are the gifts of an enemy, [Greek:  hechthron dora adora],

    Hostibus eveniant talia dona meis.

But that applies to when there is malice or guilt in him who gives them, as there was in that Eutrapelus of whom Horace speaks, who did good to people in order to give them the means of destroying themselves.  His design was evil, but God’s design cannot be better than it is.  Must God spoil his system, must there be less beauty, perfection and reason in the universe, because there are people who misuse reason?  The common sayings are in place here:  Abusus non tollit usum; there is scandalum datum et scandalum acceptum.

120.  V.  ’A maleficent being is very capable of heaping magnificent gifts upon his enemies, when he knows that they will make thereof a use that will destroy them.  It therefore does not beseem the infinitely good Being to give to creatures a free will, whereof, as he knows for certain, they would make a use that would render them unhappy.  Therefore if he gives them free will he combines with it the art of using it always opportunely, and permits not that they neglect the practice of this art in any [192] conjuncture; and if there were no sure means of determining the good use of this free will, he would rather take from them this faculty, than allow it to be the cause of their unhappiness.  That is the more manifest, as free will is a grace which he has given them of his own choice and without their asking for it; so that he would be more answerable for the unhappiness it would bring upon them than if he had only granted it in response to their importunate prayers.’