115.  VII.  ’He offers grace to people that he knows are destined not to accept it, and so destined by this refusal to make themselves more criminal than they would be if he had not offered them that grace; he assures them that it is his ardent wish that they accept it, and he does not give them the grace which he knows they would accept.’  It is true that these people become more criminal through their refusal than if one had offered them nothing, and that God knows this.  Yet it is better to permit their crime than to act in a way which would render God himself blameworthy, and provide the criminals with some justification for the complaint that it was not possible for them to do better, even though they had or might have wished it.  God desires that they receive such grace from him as they are fit to receive, and that they accept it; and he desires to give them in particular that grace whose acceptance by them he foresees:  but it is always by a will antecedent, detached or particular, which cannot always be carried out in the general plan of things.  This thesis also is among the number of those which philosophy establishes no less than revelation, like three others of the seven that we have just stated here, the third, fourth and fifth being the only ones where revelation is necessary.

[187] 116.  Here now are the nineteen philosophic maxims which M. Bayle opposes to the seven theological propositions.

I.  ’As the infinitely perfect Being finds in himself a glory and a bliss that can never either diminish or increase, his goodness alone has determined him to create this universe:  neither the ambition to be praised, nor any interested motive of preserving or augmenting his bliss and his glory, has had any part therein.’  This maxim is very good:  praises of God do him no service, but they are of service to the men who praise him, and he desired their good.  Nevertheless, when one says that goodness alone determined God to create this universe, it is well to add that his GOODNESS prompted him antecedently to create and to produce all possible good; but that his WISDOM made the choice and caused him to select the best consequently; and finally that his POWER gave him the means to carry out actually the great design which he had formed.

117.  II.  ’The goodness of the infinitely perfect Being is infinite, and would not be infinite if one could conceive of a goodness greater than this.  This characteristic of infinity is proper also to all his other perfections, to love of virtue, hatred of vice, etc., they must be the greatest one can imagine. (See M. Jurieu in the first three sections of the Judgement on Methods, where he argues constantly upon this principle, as upon a primary notion.  See also in Wittich, De Providentia Dei, n. 12, these words of St. Augustine, lib.  I, De Doctrina Christiana, c. 7:  “Cum cogitatur Deus, ita cogitatur, ut aliquid, quo nihil melius sit atque sublimius.  Et paulo post:  Nec quisquam inveniri potest, qui hoc Deum credat esse, quo melius aliquid est.")’