113.  V.  ’It has pleased him by his infinite mercy to deliver a very few men from this condemnation; and, leaving them exposed during this life to the corruption of sin and misery, he has given them aids which enable them to obtain the never-ending bliss of paradise.’  Many in the past have doubted, as I have already observed, whether the number of the damned is so great as is generally supposed; and it appears that they believed in the existence of some intermediate state between eternal damnation and perfect bliss.  But we have no need of these opinions, and it is enough to keep to the ideas accepted in the Church.  In this connexion it is well to observe that this proposition of M. Bayle’s is conceived in accordance with the principles of sufficient grace, given to all men, and sufficing them provided that they have good will.  Although M. Bayle holds the opposite opinion, he wished (as he states in the margin) to avoid the terms that would not agree with a system of decrees subsequent to the prevision of contingent events.

114.  VI.  ’He foresaw from eternity all that which should happen, he ordered all things and placed them each one in its own place, and he guides and controls them continually, according to his pleasure.  Thus nothing is done without his permission or against his will, and he can prevent, as seems good to him, as much and as often as seems good to him, all that does not please him, and in consequence sin, which is the thing in the world that most offends him and that he most detests; and he can produce in each human soul all the thoughts that he approves.’  This thesis is also purely philosophic, that is, recognizable by the light of natural reason.  It is opportune also, as one has dwelt in thesis II on that which pleases, to dwell here upon that which seems good, that is, upon that which God finds good to do.  He can avoid or put away as ‘seems good to him’ all ’that does not please him’.  Nevertheless it must be borne in mind that some objects of his aversion, such as certain evils, and especially sin, which his [186] antecedent will repelled, could only have been rejected by his consequent or decretory will, in so far as it was prompted by the rule of the best, which the All-wise must choose after having taken all into account.  When one says ‘that sin offends God most, and that he detests it most’, these are human ways of speaking.  God cannot, properly speaking, be offended, that is, injured, disturbed, disquieted or angered; and he detests nothing of that which exists, in the sense that to detest something is to look upon it with abomination and in a way that causes us disgust, that greatly pains and distresses us; for God cannot suffer either vexation, or grief or discomfort; he is always altogether content and at ease.  Yet these expressions in their true sense are justified.  The supreme goodness of God causes his antecedent will to repel all evil, but moral evil more than any other:  it only admits evil at all for irresistible superior reasons, and with great correctives which repair its ill effects to good advantage.  It is true also that God could produce in each human soul all the thoughts that he approves:  but this would be to act by miracles, more than his most perfectly conceived plan admits.