108.  He does this by permitting it justly, and by directing it wisely towards the good, as I have shown in a manner that appears tolerably intelligible.  But as it is here principally that M. Bayle undertakes [183] to discomfit those who maintain that there is nothing in faith which cannot be harmonized with reason, it is also here especially I must show that my dogmas are fortified (to make use of his own allegory) with a rampart, even of reasons, which is able to resist the fire of his strongest batteries.  He has ranged them against me in chapter 144 of his Reply to the Questions of a Provincial (vol.  III, p. 812), where he includes the theological doctrine in seven propositions and opposes thereto nineteen philosophic maxims, like so many large cannon capable of breaching my rampart.  Let us begin with the theological propositions.

109.  I.  ‘God,’ he says, ’the Being eternal and necessary, infinitely good, holy, wise and powerful, possesses from all eternity a glory and a bliss that can never either increase or diminish.’  This proposition of M. Bayle’s is no less philosophical than theological.  To say that God possesses a ‘glory’ when he is alone, that depends upon the meaning of the term.  One may say, with some, that glory is the satisfaction one finds in being aware of one’s own perfections; and in this sense God possesses it always.  But when glory signifies that others become aware of these perfections, one may say that God acquires it only when he reveals himself to intelligent creatures; even though it be true that God thereby gains no new good, and it is rather the rational creatures who thence derive advantage, when they apprehend aright the glory of God.

110.  II.  ’He resolved freely upon the production of creatures, and he chose from among an infinite number of possible beings those whom it pleased him to choose, to give them existence, and to compose the universe of them, while he left all the rest in nothingness.’  This proposition is also, just like the preceding one, in close conformity with that part of philosophy which is called natural theology.  One must dwell a little on what is said here, that he chose the possible beings ‘whom it pleased him to choose’.  For it must be borne in mind that when I say, ‘that pleases me’, it is as though I were saying, ‘I find it good’.  Thus it is the ideal goodness of the object which pleases, and which makes me choose it among many others which do not please or which please less, that is to say, which contain less of that goodness which moves me.  Now it is only the genuinely good that is capable of pleasing God:  and consequently that which pleases God most, and which meets his choice, is the best.

[184] 111.  III.  ’Human nature having been among the Beings that he willed to produce, he created a man and a woman, and granted them amongst other favours free will, so that they had the power to obey him; but he threatened them with death if they should disobey the order that he gave them to abstain from a certain fruit.’  This proposition is in part revealed, and should be admitted without difficulty, provided that free will be understood properly, according to the explanation I have given.