63.  Far from its being prejudicial, nothing can be more favourable to freedom than that system.  And M. Jacquelot has demonstrated well in his book on the Conformity of Faith with Reason, that it is just as if he who knows all that I shall order a servant to do the whole day long on the morrow made an automaton entirely resembling this servant, to carry out to-morrow at the right moment all that I should order; and yet that would not prevent me from ordering freely all that I should please, although the action of the automaton that would serve me would not be in the least free.

64.  Moreover, since all that passes in the soul depends, according to this system, only upon the soul, and its subsequent state is derived only from it and from its present state, how can one give it a greater independence?  It is true that there still remains some imperfection in the constitution of the soul.  All that happens to the soul depends upon it, but depends not always upon its will; that were too much.  Nor are such[158] happenings even recognized always by its understanding or perceived with distinctness.  For there is in the soul not only an order of distinct perceptions, forming its dominion, but also a series of confused perceptions or passions, forming its bondage:  and there is no need for astonishment at that; the soul would be a Divinity if it had none but distinct perceptions.  It has nevertheless some power over these confused perceptions also, even if in an indirect manner.  For although it cannot change its passions forthwith, it can work from afar towards that end with enough success, and endue itself with new passions and even habits.  It even has a like power over the more distinct perceptions, being able to endue itself indirectly with opinions and intentions, and to hinder itself from having this one or that, and stay or hasten its judgement.  For we can seek means beforehand to arrest ourselves, when occasion arises, on the sliding step of a rash judgement; we can find some incident to justify postponement of our resolution even at the moment when the matter appears ready to be judged.  Although our opinion and our act of willing be not directly objects of our will (as I have already observed), one sometimes, takes measures nevertheless, to will and even to believe in due time, that which one does not will, or believe, now.  So great is the profundity of the spirit of man.

65.  And now, to bring to a conclusion this question of spontaneity, it must be said that, on a rigorous definition, the soul has within it the principle of all its actions, and even of all its passions, and that the same is true in all the simple substances scattered throughout Nature, although there be freedom only in those that are intelligent.  In the popular sense notwithstanding, speaking in accordance with appearances, we must say that the soul depends in some way upon the body and upon the impressions of the senses:  much as we speak with Ptolemy and Tycho in everyday converse, and think with Copernicus, when it is a question of the rising and the setting of the sun.