43.  But if the foreknowledge of God has nothing to do with the dependence or independence of our free actions, it is not so with the foreordinance of God, his decrees, and the sequence of causes which, as I believe, always contribute to the determination of the will.  And if I am for the Molinists in the first point, I am for the predeterminators in the second, provided always that predetermination be taken as not necessitating.  In a word, I am of opinion that the will is always more inclined towards the course it adopts, but that it is never bound by the necessity to adopt it.  That it will adopt this course is certain, but it is not necessary.  The case corresponds to that of the famous saying, Astra inclinant, non necessitant, although here the similarity is not complete.  For the event towards which the stars tend (to speak with the common herd, as if there were some foundation for astrology) does not always come to pass, whereas the course towards which the will is more inclined never fails to be adopted.  Moreover the stars would form only a part of the inclinations that co-operate in the event, but when one speaks of the greater inclination of the will, one speaks of the result of all the inclinations.  It is almost as we have spoken above of the consequent will in God, which results from all the antecedent wills.

44.  Nevertheless, objective certainty or determination does not bring about the necessity of the determinate truth.  All philosophers acknowledge this, asserting that the truth of contingent futurities is determinate, and that nevertheless they remain contingent.  The thing indeed would imply no contradiction in itself if the effect did not follow; and therein lies contingency.  The better to understand this point, we must take into account that there are two great principles of our arguments.  The one is the principle of contradiction, stating that of two contradictory propositions the one is true, the other false; the other principle is that of the determinant reason:  it states that nothing ever comes to pass without there being a cause or at least a reason determining it, that is, something to give an a priori reason why it is existent rather than non-existent, and in this wise rather than in any other.  This great principle holds for all events, and a contrary instance will never be supplied:  and although more often than not we are insufficiently [148] acquainted with these determinant reasons, we perceive nevertheless that there are such.  Were it not for this great principle we could never prove the existence of God, and we should lose an infinitude of very just and very profitable arguments whereof it is the foundation; moreover, it suffers no exception, for otherwise its force would be weakened.  Besides, nothing is so weak as those systems where all is unsteady and full of exceptions.  That fault cannot be laid to the charge of the system I approve, where everything happens in accordance with general rules that at most are mutually restrictive.