from it and containing a variation not only in the perfections that God has communicated to the creature, but also in the limitations that the creature, being what it is, brings with it.  Thus we see that there is an actual distinction between the substance and its modification or accidents, contrary to the opinion of some moderns and in particular of the late Duke of Buckingham, who spoke of that in a little Discourse on Religion recently reprinted.  Evil is therefore like darkness, and not only ignorance but also error and malice consist formally in a certain kind of privation.  Here is an example of error which we have already employed.  I see a tower which from a distance appears round although it is square.  The thought that the tower is what it appears to be flows naturally from that which I see; and when I dwell on this thought it is an affirmation, it is a false judgement; but if I pursue the examination, if some reflexion causes me to perceive that appearances deceive me, lo and behold, I abandon my error.  To abide in a certain place, or not to go further, not to espy some landmark, these are privations.

33.  It is the same in respect of malice or ill will.  The will tends towards good in general, it must strive after the perfection that befits us, and the supreme perfection is in God.  All pleasures have within themselves some feeling of perfection.  But when one is limited to the pleasures of the senses, or to other pleasures to the detriment of greater good, as of health, of virtue, of union with God, of felicity, it is in this privation of a further aspiration that the defect consists.  In general perfection is positive, it is an absolute reality; defect is privative, it comes from limitation and tends towards new privations.  This saying is therefore as true as it is ancient:  bonum ex causa integra, malum ex quolibet defectu; as also that which states:  malum causam habet non efficientem, sed [143] deficientem.  And I hope that the meaning of these axioms will be better apprehended after what I have just said.

34.  The physical co-operation of God and of creatures with the will contributes also to the difficulties existing in regard to freedom.  I am of opinion that our will is exempt not only from constraint but also from necessity.  Aristotle has already observed that there are two things in freedom, to wit, spontaneity and choice, and therein lies our mastery over our actions.  When we act freely we are not being forced, as would happen if we were pushed on to a precipice and thrown from top to bottom; and we are not prevented from having the mind free when we deliberate, as would happen if we were given a draught to deprive us of discernment.  There is contingency in a thousand actions of Nature; but when there is no judgement in him who acts there is no freedom.  And if we had judgement not accompanied by any inclination to act, our soul would be an understanding without will.